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ABSTRACT
The system for converting former military bases to ci-
vilian uses is incomplete in its present form. As it stands,
it is not capable of functioning without voluntary private
sector cooperAtion. This has resulted in a conversion pro-
cess that is based on the assumption that when the point of
marketing is reached, the private sector will cooperate. This
is in contrast to the actual situation, a situation in which
the private sector operates according to its own pLans, not
according to how public agencies would like it to operate.
This thesis examines the role of grass roots dedication
and determination in the conversion process and compares that
with the role of the private sector in the conversion of the
Boston Naval Shipyard, Charlestown. Alternatives to the ex-
isting situation, changes which would take into account the
importance of private sector cooperation, are suggested.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION-
Part I: The Conversion Process
CHAPTER
I. Federal Surplus Property Disposal
III. Learning From Experience
I. The New York Naval Shipyard
II. The Watertown Arsenal
III. If We Were Starting Over...
III. Converting the Boston Naval Shipyard at
Charlestown to Civilian Uses
I. The Charlestown Community
II. Earlier Bouts with Closure
III. Responses tp the Announcement of
Closure, 1973
IV. Re-Use Prospectives
V. The City's Planning Process
Page. 1
6
Part II: Determinants of a Successful Conversion
CHAPTER
IV. Public Agencies and Successful Conversion
I~. Federal Agencies
II. State Agencies and Actors
III, City Agencies
IV. Community Organizations and Actors
V. Can They Achieve a "Successful" Conversion?
V. The Actual Determinants
I. The Highest and Best Use - Shipbuilding
6
11
11
21
29
33
33
37
41
45
54
62
62
62
69
73
78
80
84
85
iv
CHAPTER PAGE
V. II. The Highest and Best Use - Industrial Uses 86
III. The Highest and Best Use -
ResidentiaL/Commercial 92
IV. And The Winner Is...On Which Use. WiLL
the Appraisal be Based? 93
Yr. Alternatives to the Existing Situation 95
VII. Conclusion 105
Footnotes 110
Bibliography 117
ACKNOWLEDGEIvEN TS
Thanks are in order for the following people. Their com-
ments and insights have provided direction and support in the
preparation of this thesis: Tunney Lee, Robert Sadock, Phil
Herr, Jeffrey Pressman, Maureen Steinbruner, And Diane Sanger.
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Defense owns and operates more than
a thousand military bases in countries all over the world.
In an effort to maintain an efficient allocation of monetary
resources, these operations are periodically evaluated. Re-
alignments, those adjustments in operations which are neces-
sary for cost-effectiveness, result which consist of an in-
crease in military personal and expenditures at a base, a de-
crease in activities and expenditures or a total deactivation
of the base. In April, 1973, the Secretary of Defense an-
nounced that 270 separate actions were being taken to close,
reduce or consolidate military bases in the United States-as
part of a plan to realign the nation's armed forces for the
post-Vietnam world. Among these were the closing of forty
major military bases.
When a military base closes, there is a possibility that
the community in which it is located will be faced with the
decision of how to re-use the abandoned property. This thestis
examines the process of converting former military installa-
tions to civilian re-use. Conversion is the act of changing
property from a federal military use to another use and it
involves federal disposal of the property, formulation of a
plan for redevelopment of that property and implementation
of the plan. It has been undertaken by innumerable commun-
ities since 1949 when the present disposal system was es-
tablished. The experience of each community has been used
to refine the process.
2The purpose of this thesis is to examine the adequacy
of the existing system for the conversion of the Boston Na-
val Shipyard at Charlestown, known as the Charlestown Navy
Yard, to civilain use. Established in 1800 by an act of Con-
gress, many of its buildings are valued by historic preserva-
tionists. In 1966 it was placed on the National Register of
Historic Places. Located on 130 acres of land on Boston's
Inner Harbor, the Shipyard consisted of two drydocks and sixty-
five structures when it was closed in April, 1973. The Char-
lestown Shipyard serves as an excellent case study for eval-
uating the system of conversion. Its facilities, age, loca-
tion, historical status and the time at which it was sur-
plussed all combine to make the Charlestown Shipyard the most
complex and challenging of all military base conversions.
It is important to address the problem of conversion for
a variety of reasons; economic, social, environmental, and
political. Because of their size, former military bases
hold the potential for substantially increasing a municipal-
ity's tax base and possibly affecting the economic trends of
a region. Socially, some military parcels are as large as
city neighborhoods. Inappropriate re-use could seriously af-
fect neighboring communities. The employment potential of a
base is a social as well as economic resource. Environmental
aspects of conversion include affects on city form and re-
gional environmental management. Politically, conversion of
a base can be viewed as a pawn in the political power game.
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The importance of addressing the problem also Lies in the con-
tribution which a new perspective can make to the Federal
"corporate memory" of conversion experiences.
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I is a de-
scription of the conversion process. It is presented through
three case studies: Brooklyn Shipyard, Watertown Arsenal and
Charlestown Shipyard. These also provide a sense of how the
process has evolved, the first two conversions having pro-
vided examples for Boston. Part II is an analysis of the
existing system for conversion.
Part I begins with a description of the Federal surplus
property disposal procedure. Two case studies are then pre-
sented: New York's Brooklyn Naval Shipyard and the Water-
town Arsenal, Watertown, Myassachusetts. These are included
because of their applicability to the Charlestown situation
and because they served as examples of conversion for Boston.
What Boston learned from the two cases is discussed. This is
followed by an examination of the chronolgy of events, re-
sponses to the announcement of closure and the need for con-
version. This includes a brief description of the groups in-
volved, their immediate responses to the announcement, the
chronolgy of events and the present status of the situation.
Part II examines the factors, both public and private,
which influence conversion. Private factors, those beyond
the control of governmental agencies, include market trends,
site characteristics and the state of the regional economy.
Public factors, those within the jurisdiction of governmen-
tal agencies, include the statutory process, prospects for
cooperation among agencies and expressed goals. This anal-
ysis is followed by a discussion of the alternatives to the
existing system and conclusions.
A number of government studies have been prepared on suc-
cessfuL conversion. These studies were used as a starting
point and foundation for the present study. Where they focused
on the governmental elements of a successful conversion, this
study goes beyond that. The examination of converting Char-
lestown does not repeat what has been previously documented.
Charlestown was chosen not because it is an example of a suc-
cess, rather because it provided the opportunity to examine
the complexity of re-use and to examine the varying criter-
ia for success and failure of conversion. Finally, this
study has been prepared from a different perspective than
earlier studies. Sponsored by federal agencies whose pur-
poses are to move funds and property, the studies reflect
their aims and are designed to move funds and property. This
study is aimed at evaluating their process of moving federal
surplus property.
Information for the study was collected in a number of
ways. The primary method was interviews. These were conduc-
ted with representatives of the following groups: Boston Re-
development Authority, Federal regional agencies, the Massa-
chsetts Government Land Bank, community groups, congressional
aides, Boston Harbor planning interests and those involved
at the municipal level with the New York and Watertown bases.
The interviews were conducted, for the most part, in person,
with a few being carried out over the telephone. During the
meetings, notes were taken which were then written up and co-
pies sent to the informant. Of these, 75fo were reviewed and
returned, some with minor comments or corrections. Periodi-
cal literature served as another source of information, help-
ing to establish the chronolgy and reconstruct the events and
responses. Published studies by all groups involved were aL-
so reviewed and planning Literature has been drawn upon.
PART I
THE CONVERSION PROCESS
CHAPTER I
FEDERAL SURPLUS PROPERTY DISPOSAL
Prior to 1949, surplus property disposal was carried
out by a number of different federal agencies. Each Land-
holding agency such as the War Assets Administration or De-
fense Plants Corporation disposed of its own personal and
real property, in whichever manner it chose. There was no
statutory procedure spelling out how to determine the value
of property or to whom it should be sold. In some cases, pro-
perty was given away or sold at a nominal fee. In the Late
1940's, this process was reviewed by members of Congress who
believed that the Federal government should be realizing re-
turns from the disposal of federal property. A system of
priorities and fair market value sales was proposed.
In 1949, the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act was adopted. This Act created the General Services Ad-
ministration to be the sole agency responsible for the dis-
posal of federal surplus property. An exception to this is
the Defense Department's authority to dispose of its property
up to $1,000 in value. The Act also established a means of
identifying surplus property and of price negotiation.
In the determining of property as surplus, a federal a-
gency submits its reports of excess property to the General
Services Administration (GSA). Executive agencies are then
notified by GSA of the property's availability. These agen-
?aies have thirty days in which to notify GSA of their inter-
est in the excess property. Any excess property which the
Administrator of General Services determines is not required
for the needs and discharge of the responsibilities of all fed-
eral agencies is then declared "surplus property". Follow-
ing this federal review, the surplus property is offered to
states, local subdivisions and other public instrumentali-
ties at the same time and without priority. These public a-
gencies may be interested in acquiring the property through
a public benefit discount or they may choose a negotiated
sale. The final decision on public applications for pro-
perty is made by the Administrator of General Services on the
basis of recommendations by regional administrators and other
federal agencies, such as the Department of the Interior. If
no public agencies are interested in acquiring the property,
or if their applications are rejected by GSA, the property
will be placed on the market for general bidding at auction.
This action is subject to a determination by the GSA Region-
al Administrator that marketing of the property at any spe-
cific point in time is appropriate to the realization of an
adequate price.
The Federal Property Act stipulates that surplus property
be appraised based on the highest and best use for *hich there
is a current market. The appraisal is reviewed by the Fed-
eral government for reasonableness and from it a "negotiated
price" is determined. The negotiated price is the price
8sent to the public applicant. By statute, GSA can not go be-
Low the price established and reviewed by federal committees
and agencies. It is not allowed to be liberal in the nego-
tiating process.
The methods of acquisition for a public agency have been
expanded. Amendments since 1949 provide for public benefit
discounts for certain public uses. The Secretary of the In-
terior is authorized to convey property for historic monu-
ment purposes without monetary consideration and for public
parks or recreational use allowing up to a 100% public bene-
fit allowance. For either purpose, property shall be used
and maintained as such in perpetuity. The Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration may convey any surplus
real property or personal property for the operation and
maintenance of a public airport, without monetary cons idera-
tion. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare may
convey property for public health or educational uses giving
up to a 100% public benefit allowance and requiring that the
property be used for the specific purpose continuously for a
specified period of time. The federal agency having original
jurisdiction or control of the property may transfer land for
wildlife conservation, without reimbursement or transfer of
funds. Finally, an additional amendment, though not yet a-
dopted, proposes that the Secretary of Commerce be authorized
to transfer property for economic development purposes pro-
viding up to a 75% public benefit discount. If any of the
9
above conditions of transfer are not adhered to by the reci-
pient, the Land becomes subject to recapture by the Federal
government.
A public agency interested in acquisition of surplus
property must submit a written response to GSA. This response
must be made within twenty days of the surplus status dec Lar-
ation and must: (i) disclose the contemplated use of the pro-
perty; (ii) contain a citation of the applicable statute or
statutes under which the public agency desires to acquire the
property; (iii) disclose the nature of the interest, if an
interest less than fee title is contemplated; (iv) state the
length of time required to develop formal application for
the property; and (v) give the reason for the length of time
required.
Pending disposition of the property, the federal agency
which owned or controlled the property is responsible for its
protection and maintenance. However, interim leases may be
arranged, with GSA's approval. Such leases may not exceed
one year and are subject to revocation on not to exceed thirty
days* notice.
Over the years, federal property procedures have be-
come more liberal with respect to civilian take-over of for-
mer military property: earlier access to real estate is a-
vailable and it is not unusual for a community to receive per-
mission to keep personal property in place to speed the
start-up of civilian activities. These modifications have
10
been based on experiences such as those described in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER II
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
One of the Defense Department's most comprehensive re-
alignment programs was undertaken in 1964. Considerations of
cost savings were paramount in the decisions, with an ex-
pected savings on the order of $477 million. Many of the
installations affected were quite old and historic, among
them the Brooklyn Shipyard and the Watertown Arsenal. Loca-
ted in metropolitan areas, these last two bases presented
special problems in conversion.
I. THE NEW YORK NAVAL SHIPYARD
In 1964 the Defense Department, working to cut costs,
prepared a study of the Navy's eleven shipyards. Of the
four North Eastern yards - Philadelphia, New York, Boston
and Portsmouth, N. H. - it was determined that the greatest
savings could be realized by closing the New York Naval Ship-
yard at Brooklyn. The three remaining shipyards were encour-
aged to keep their costs low.
The realignment was announced in November, 1964. Com-
plete closure of the base, known as the Brooklyn Shipyard,
was to be accomplished by June of 1966 and would result in
the elimination of 9,771 civilian and 165 military jobs.
Involved in the closure were 265 acres of land containing
five piers and about 600 structures, of which ten to fifteen
were evaluated as "suitable for industrial uses".1
12
Following the announcement normal disposal procedures
for excess property were undertaken by GSA. Originally, two
federal agencies had made claims to portions of the site.
But, with the aid of congressional pressure, these claims
were dropped in March, 1966, to allow negotiations to occur
directly with New York City.
In the words of a person now associated with development
of the Yard, at the time of closure it was "studied to death"
by local officials and their consultants.2 Proposals for
re-use ranged from filling the yard's drydocks and paving the
site for parking to develop$tng a State Park to constructing
public housing to converting the Yard to a private shipyard.
The studies were useless3 and the City determined to re-use
the site as an industrial park to help alleviate severe un-
employment in the vicinity of the Shipyard. In fact, this
was an appropriate decision given the characteristics of the
site. The Shipyard offers a unique location and industrial
facilities. It consists of industrial type buildings, is
wholly enclosed, has an industrially related waterfront and
is zoned for industry. Additionally, the Shipyard contains
rail lines which, though not connected to an outside rail
system, provide the potential for future connections or the
transport of rail cars by barge. The Yard is located two
minutes from the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway and twenty min-
utes from LaGuardia Airport. (See map, page 13)
The original value set on the Shipyard was $55 million;
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due to the depressed condition of the area and the City's
goal of redeveloping the site as an industrial park, this was
4decreased to $24 million. At this time, employment projec-
tions in the area of 20,000 were made by public officials.
Such figures were comparable to peak wartime employment on
the Shipyard and were totally unrealistic for the projected
redevelopment. No studies were ever carried out to determine
accurate employment figures; someone*s early generousity or
enthusiasm saddled the City with a forecast which it would
never be able to meet.
In February of 1966 a non-profit local development cor-
poration was formed by the City to manage the redevelopment
of the Yard. The Commerce Labor Industry Corporation of
Kings (CLICK) was composed of power structure members: Brook-
lyn businessmen, civic leaders and elected officials - people
interested in the economic survival and growth of Brooklyn.
Later that year, CLICK began operating under a permit of
entry issued by the GSA. The City acquired the site in 1968.
Though there were over fifty major industrial buildings
of different types on the site, the existing facilities were
not readily adaptable for modern use for a number of reasons.
Being a Federal installation, all construction at the Shipyard
had been undertaken by the Federal government without con-
sideration of the New York City building codes. Consequent-
ly, CLICK found it impossible to obtain Certificates of Oc-
cupancy from the City Building Department. Age and neglect
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had combined to severely damage most of the facilities and
structures and the utilities in the Yard were in a state of
almost total disrepair.5 This was what represented "a uni-
que opportunity to reintegrate the Yard with the life of the
local communities and the City as a whole." 6
The Yard is located in the Bedford-Stuyvesant, Fort
Green and Williamsburg section of the Brooklyn Borough, an
area which in the late 19600s was involved in the community
control movement. Between 1966 and 1971, the original or-
ganizers of CLICK were replaced by community-oriented indi-
viduals. Their imperative was to redevelop the Yard gener-
ating as many local job opportunities as possible. The
City was virtually excluded from any input in the operation
and management of the corporation and was unable to exercise
any control over the many irregularities that occurred dur-
ing this period. 7 It was a time, however, when the City and
Federal Governments were willing to pay that price to "buy"
the peace in urban minority neighborhoods.
When CLICK had come into existence in 1966, requests
for space in the Yard had exceeded the available space by
five times. But by the late 1960's, following the communi-
ty takeover of CLICK, all plans for re-use were viewed as op-
timistic. Darwin Daicoff, commissioned to prepare a report
of the economic adjustment to the Yard closure for the Fed-
eral government, summarizes this period of community control.
In summary, rapidly formulated plans were retarded
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by Lengthy negotiations between the City and the
GSA and by sporadic conflicts between local groups
concerning specific programs for redevelopment.
The effectiveness of the quasi-public corporations
which were created to handle the redevelopment
were hindered by the slowness of the State Legis-
lature in providing the necessary legal foundation
for their operation. Early optimism concerning
the effective reuse appears to have been unfounded,
and the tenants who located at the Base have thus
far not fitled the egployment void created by the
closure of the Yard.
One of the greatest obstacles to re-use during the period of
community control was the community's goal for creating local
job opportunities. All prospective tenants were evaluated in
Light of how many jobs they could produce for the community,
greatly restricting the list of possible tenants. Indus-
tries which located on the site tended to move in and out,
making the industrial park unstable. One exception to this
was the Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation. It was able to
negotiate a very advantageous lease with CLICK and provided
stability, remaining as the Largest employer and Largest te-
nant on the Yard, occupying nearly 40% of the property.
A major organizational and operational change occurred
in October, 1971, when a 99-year lease between CLICK and the
City was approved by the Board of Estimate and the Brooklyn
Borough Improvement Board. The new Lease amounted to a man-
agement contract and included an escalating rental figure
(to reach $1.7 million by mid-74) and provisions for periodic
reports and financiaL statements to be submitted to the City
and provided for the regular exchange of other operational in-
L
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formation with the City's Economic Development Administra-
tion. It also established a new, thirty-seven member Board
of Directors; nineteen of whom, including the Chairman of
the Board, are appointed by the Mayor; of the remaining
eighteen, five each are selected by community corporations
in each of the three local communities (Fort Green, WilLiams-
burg and Bedford-Stuyvesant) with the remaining three ap-
pointed by the advisory council of elected officials repre-
senting the districts adjacent to the Brooklyn Shipyard.
There were many difficulties in gaining acceptance from
representatives of the -surrounding communities and the then
management of CLICK of the new Board composition and terms
of the lease. There was community agitation based on the
mistaken belief that the City was trying to take CLICK away
from community control. In fact, the thrust of the management
lease was to expand the base of the industrial complex to
benefit the economy of the entire City.9
The new Board was installed in May, 1972. Guiding their
activities was the principle that "the corporation must be
run on a sound business-like basis in order to best achieve
the goal of creating a viable industrial complex which would
provide job opportunities to the citizens of (New York)." 10
Thus, what should have been the original operating situation
in 1966 came into existence in mid-1972. The relationship
between the City and CLICK has evolved from very bad to very
good over the ten-year period.
18
Under the new lease, the future of the industrial park
on the Brooklyn Shipyard looks brighter. At the end of
June, 1972, there were only 2,992 employees. In December,
1974, there were 4,398 and in 1975 the figure approached
5,000.11 Seatrain Shipbuilding Corporation continues to be
the largest empLoyer. A total of twenty-eight companies
(including Seatrain) are presently located on the site. These
companies range from a manufacturer of handbags to a manufac-
turer of furniture to a refurbisher of motors, a tempered and
armoured glass company, a mirror company and a foundry. The
Shipyard has truly become an industrial park.
The new tenancies are aLL in keeping with the policy of
renting waterfront space for waterfront related activities.
All of the drydocks (six) and piers (five) are being used as
such. In addition to Seatrain, Coastal Dry Dock and Repair
Corporation has located on the park's waterfront. An inter-
esting, though not unexpected, outcome of the Navy closing so
many of its shipyards is that the Federal government has been
forced to contract out for much of its ship repair. Coastal
Dry Dock has been one of the firms which has helped to meet
the Navy's needs; and on the Navy's old facilities.
According to one participant, the Yard and its facili-
ties were "fully equipped to fight the War of 1812#1,12 but
not to service industry in the 1970's.
Further growth ir! the CLICK Industrial Park had
been inhibited by the lack of available and suit-
able rentable building space. The poor condition
19
of the existing buildings negated the possibility
of attracting the types of tenants required: Com-
panies both fiscally sound and capable of providing
the much needed employment opportunities for the
unemployed and underemployed. Assessment of the
physical complex clearly revealed that demolition
of obsolete structures and new construction were
mandatory in order to attract a new balance of
industry.13
In examining the best way of continuing development of
the industrial park, it was found that the site contained
many smaller areas which could be developed as "mini-indus-
trial parks". This could only be accomplished by offering :a
developer a cleared tract of land, as was evidenced in pre-
liminary discussions with several leading nationally known
developers. Where the FederaL'officials wanted to see the
Yard modernized through rehabilitation of existing struc-
tures, the City beLieved that demolition was to be the key
that would unlock the barrier to industrial growth. The con-
cept of redevelopment through demolition commenced in June,
1974+.
Demolition on the site was restricted to obsolete struc-
tures. These were concentrated in two areas of the site:
twenty-two acres at the East End and fifteen acres on the
West End. Demolition on the former was carried out with the
help of the United States Economic Development Administration
which contributed 70% of the cost of the demolition. The
cost of demolition of the latter fifteen acres is being borne
by the City.
Ideally, given the funding, the City would like to have
20
demolished all of the buildings on the site to allow for mo-
dernizing. It has been limited to the obsolete structures,
though, and sometimes the circumstances surrounding those
have prevented their removal. None of the buildings were on
the National Register of Historic Places at the time the City
acquired the site. Since that time the City has had one lis-
ted and has future plans for housing some sort of museum in
it. However, historic value did not play an important role
in retaining structures. Rather, specialized construction
resulted in exorbitant demolition costs. For example, a
torpedo storage building consisting of reinforced concrete
would have cost $2.5 million to demolish. The only possi-
ble use was to convert it to a warehouse. Though it does not
provide as many jobs as are desired for the amount of space
occupied, the building is in..use and is bringing in revenue.
Future marketing plans for the industrial park apply to
the recently cleared acreage. Since the completion of demo-
lition, many developers have expressed interest in building
and developing these areas. CLICK is responsible for bring-
ing in private development, the only kind which will occur
as no public funds for development exist. To date, except
for the demolition funds, the City of New York has not con-
tributed any funds to the operation of the CLICK Industrial
Park.
Although $24 million was the negotiated sales price for
the Yard, acquisition cost to the City turns out to be $67 mil-
21
lion when amortization is included. The City will never be
able to recover its investment. However, an attempt was
made when the new CLICK lease was drawn up: it was estimated
that an annual rent of $1.7 million would return the invest-
ment over the life of the 99-year lease. In 1974, CLICK paid
the City $1.04 million in rent. According to CLICK's account-
ants, it is questionable whether CLICK is capable of ever
paying $1.7 million. 4  If a suitable arrangement between
CLICK and the City is not achieved, CLICK considers its con-
tinued existence in its present form as doubtful. Thus, the
City has adopted the perspective of re-couping its investment
through employment and the ripple effect.15 The emphasis is
on what is brought into the City as a whole, not on a balance
sheet accountant approach. This has its problems, though,
given that the City's Economic Development Administration
is financially responsible to the City's accountants.
New York has what it has in the Brooklyn Shipyard and
is realistically trying to make that work. The 20,000 jobs
originally promised will never be realized nor will the in-
vestment of $67 million be re-couped, but the 5,000 jobs are
5,000 more than there were when the Yard was closed in 1966
and can be considered as 5,000 individuals off of the City's
welfare roLes.
II. THE WATERTOWN ARSENAL
In April, 1964, seven months prior to the New York an-
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nouncement, the Defense Department announced that the Water-
town Arsenal was to be deactivated. Complete closure of the
Arsenal was to be accomplished by early 1967. Purchased
gradually from 1816 through 1948, the Arsenal consisted of
59 acres overlooking a bend in the Charles River near Boston.
At its peak, during World War II, over 10,000 people had
been employed at the Arsenal. In the closure, 2,300 jobs
were eliminated. The community's initial response to the de-
activation notice was shock over the major loss of employ-
ment. This was followed by the struggle of the congressional
delegation in Washington to keep the base in operation. This
struggle, however, did not succeed in altering the Defense
Department's decision and normal disposal procedures were un-
dertaken.
By 1965, the Watertown Selectmen had begun to look at
possible alternative uses for the site and an Arsenal Study
Committee was established for this purpose. The redevelop-
ment of the site was advocated by a consultant study, the
Study Committee and the Watertown Planning Board. Town offi-
cials were told by GSA that sale to the Town could be finan-
ced by a private developer (through immediate resale) only if
the Town had a Federally approved urban redevelopment pro-
gram. The question: Should redeveLopment occur a±t all in
Watertown? was central to the redevelopment decision. Across
the Charles River, in Boston, entire neighborhoods were being
relocated in the urban renewal process. Yet urban renewal
23
was the only mechanism in existence which could provide the
financial assistance for Watertown to purchase and redevelop
the property for a private developer. Following a great deal
of discussion, Town Meeting agreed to allow urban renewal on
the condition that its operations be limited to the Arsenal.
The Watertown Redevelopment Authority (WRA) was created and
authorized to operate on the Arsenal, but no where else in
Watertown. (See map, page 24).
Initial proposals for redevelopment of the site were sur-
rounded by a state of euphoria. The Polaroid Corporation had
expressed an interest in purchasing and developing the site
in the near future and the economic climate of the region
was near its peak. Located in the Boston metropolitan area,
on the direct route from Boston to the center of Watertown,
redevelopment of the Arsenal held the promise of a financial
bonanza for the Town. Viewed as a prime parcel of industrial
land, the site would be an important addition to the Town's
tax base. Town leaders strongly believed that Watertown
needel to increase its tax base and the Arsenal represented
one of the few opportunities for expansion. The idea of
using a portion of the site for a public park had been sug-
gested by a number of Town groups, including the Planning
Board, the Conservation Commission and the Park Commission.
But the enthusiasm for redevelopment of the site reduced the
idea to a small parcel.16
Watertown also saw acquisition as a means of protect-
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ing the site from uncontrollable and undesirable development.
According to a brochure distributed by the WRA to Watertown
citizens, "The Arsenal Project and You.-- Opportunity
Knocks", the "danger in allowing (GSA to conduct a private
sealed bid sale)...was the exploitation of the land and buil-
dings for commercial and speculative purposes by private de-
velopers."17 Through the redevelopment process, the bro-
chure suggested, the
maximum amount of control could be exercised over
the type and character of the new business that
would be created. Most importantly, the RedeveL-
opment Authority (could) insure the highest tax
revenue fjgm the property in as short a time as
possiblee
WRA anticipated full development of the site to be completed
by December, 1979.
In 1968, Town Meeting approved a plan for an office-
industrial park which had been prepared for the WRA by consul-
tants, Metcalf and Eddy. It also appropriated $6,385,000 to
cover the purchase and operating costs of the 59 acres. The
Town had been assured by the WRA that it would act as a straw
for only a short time, "minutes" according to one partici-
pant,1 9 until a private developer came along. The Town
would then be reimbursed. This assurance was based on the
assumption that the Polaroid Corporation would acquire the
land immediately. In fact, all purchase plans and site
plans had been designed for the prospective purchaser/devel-
oper, Polaroid.
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Following the Town's acquisition of the Arsenal through
the WRA, the outlook for redevelopment changed substantially.
The WRA had been slow in gearing up and two years had elapsed
between its creation and the time the Town approved the plan
and appropriated funds. By this time, all of the developers
expressing an early interest in the site had vanished. The
Town was left with plans tailored to meet the developers'
needs, particularly those of Polaroid. When Polaroid with-
drew its interests in Novermber, 1968, WRA was left without
a means of implementing its plans.
Delays on the part of the WRA only partially account for
the total lack of developer interest in the site. Shortly
after :the site had been purchased by Watertown, the economic
climate began to shift downward. WRA was hamstrung both by
the market shift and by the heavy purchase price behind it.
Further complicating redevelopment was the vacating of the
adjacent B. F. Goodrich site within two years of the Polar-
old withdrawal. This move meant that the development of both
sites was interdependent.
At the time of the negotiated sale between GSA and WRA,
no arrangement was made for supplying the property with heat.
The Army had retained a few acres of the site for administra-
tive uses and this portion housed the steam plant. Because
heating had not been included in the sale, the heating pipe-
lines had literally been cut when the Army pulled out in
1967, leaving the Town's parcel without heat. 2 o This great-
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ly restricted the possibilities for re-use of the facilities;
WRA interim uses have been short-term tenants for warehousing
and cold storage. The lack of a heating negotiation was a
primary deterent to tenancy in the buildings and this lack
of tenancy has, in turn, led to serious deterioration of the
property and buildings through vandalism and lack of main-
tenance.
Since the WRA purchased the property in 1968, a number
of proposals and developers have come and gone. Polaroid
was the first in a series of developers who lost interest in
the site and located elsewhere. Among them have been: a
mini-city (which met with strong opposition from Town resi-
dents); the University of Massachusetts, Boston campus; the
Boston Cultural Alliance; the Kennedy Corporation; and var-
ious public uses proposed by groups such as the Conserva-
tion Commission or individuals. 21 Watertown is a struggle
which has gotten no where.
The WRA has been able to meet all of its operating ex-
penses through low intensity uses such as warehousing. In
1969, the Authority returned $160,100 to the Town and in
1970, $50,000. Since then,'"the Town has not received any
cash income from the property, nor has it seen any of the
returns anticipated from the sale of surplus/salvage mater-
ials on the site.
As long as the WRA can meet its operating costs, there
is no motivation for it to intensify its development of the
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site. Thus, its modus operandi has been described as "main-
tenance of the status quo."2 2 The thrust for permanent
disposition of the site does not exist within the established
mechanism of the WRA. In 1972, the community saw it as
their responsibility to provide the missing motivation. Wa-
tertown citizens generated their own Public Use Plan for the
Arsenal. The proposal suggested mixed uses, including a
cultural complex, educational components, open space and a
commercial component as contrasted with the commercial focus
of the traditional urban renewal approach. In 1973, a Com-
mittee was appointed to test its feasibility. With assistance
from the Defense Department's Office of Economic Adjustment,
Watertown successfully requested an Economic Development Ad-
ministration Technical Assistance Grant for the public use
planning effort. In 1975, Town Meeting approved an amended
urban renewal plan which divided the site equally between
public uses and private development.
The actual growth of public uses has been gradual. WRA,
much as it talked of income producing uses, has in fact, been
subsidizing a number of Town activities in lieu of payments
to the Town, providing space for human services and commun-
ity centers. These are only temporary uses, pending a devel-
oper for the site. The remainder of the site is occupied by
short-term tenants who use the building shells for warehous-
ing. Shells of buildings are all that are Left from the 1968
transfer; all of the removable fixtures have been removed
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for salvaging or simply vandalized. The current community
goals are to get something going on the site. A summary of
activities on the Watertown Arsenal to date: "Things have
been occurring all along, they just are not visible, phy-
sical activities which gives the impression that nothing is
happening when actually quite a bit of planning activity has
taken place since 1968."23
The original goal guiding redevelopment of the site was
re-couping of the Town's investment. Present goals are but
a shadow of the original. Over the twenty-year bonding per-
iod, the average Watertown taxpayer will pay $1,000 toward
the Arsenal acquisition.24 The community is now resigned
to not seeing its full investment retrieved, but is urging
that action be taken so that it might realize monetary re-
turns and public benefit. "If a developer came along with
a plan and dependable financial backing, the Town would prob-
ably say 'Go ahead'."25
III. IF WE WERE STARTING OVER....
The experiences of New York and Watertown served to
"pave the way" for other urban base closings in the North
East. Participants from both bases, blest now with retro-
spect, have identified four oversights from which other pul
blic agencies can learn and in turn apply the lessons to fu-
ture base conversions. These oversights are: (i) the need
for a thorough inventory of the facilities prior to serious
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consideration of qcquisition; (2) the need for protection
and maintenance between excessing and transferral of the pro-
perty to the public agency; (3) the need for a comprehensive
financial and marketing analysis; and (4) the need to mini-
mize the public investment in the property and its facilities.
In both cases, the need for a thorough review of and in-
ventory of facilities was emphasized. This would include
examining the age, condition and re-use potential with an
eye toward the future marketing of the site. New York ne-
glected to carry out such an inventory. When the acquisi-
tion was confirmed, they found they had purchased a ship-
yard fully equipped to fight the War of 1812; rehabilita-
tion would not provide the degree of modernization neces-
sary to market the buildings, many buildings were not fit
for occupancy according to New York City's building codes
and those structures which should have been demolished had
to be retained due to the expense. Watertown had prepared
a counter-appraisal for the negotiated sale which included
a $500,000 discount for the estimated demolition and decon-
tamination costs. Otherwise, they were totally unaware of
facility characteristics or conditions and hence encounter-
ed unanticipated costs of building demolition and equipment
removal.
The lack of adequate protection -and maintenance agree-
ments between the Defense Department and both municipali-
ties resulted in rapid and serious deterioration of facil-
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ities. It has been estimated that the failure
to undertake property maintenance in the Brooklyn
Navy Yard resulted in more than $1 million in da-
mages when it was 1ransferred 2 9rom the federal
government to New York City.
At the Arsenal, Watertown lost the returns anticipated from
the sale of salvage due to inadequate protection and mainte-
nance. All removable fixtures were removed and the site
vandalized until only the shells of buildings remained.
Socially and economically, the period in which Brooklyn
and Watertown were purchased was very different from today.
The mid-60's was the time of the Great Society; funds a-
bounded for investments in neighborhoods and in keeping the
peace in the cities. Unlike today, the real estate market
was booming. The municipalities had visions of financial
bonanzas, excessive demand for the property and financial
assistance from urban renewal. Ten years later, the outlook
has changed. For New York, the most important considerations
in recent re-use efforts have been (i) minimizing the amount
of public funds invested in the operation of the industrial
park thereby placing demands on the private sector for de-
velopment funding and (ii) focusing on the job generating
capacities of prospective tenants as opposed to their abil-
ity to generate tax revenues. The monetary expectations of
Watertown have been modified. The WRA, in its 1970 report
to the Town, concludes that the goals set in 1968 are pro-
bably:
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unachievable. The successful development of the
Arsenal will not solve all the tax problems of
Watertown. Successful development of such a large
parcel will take a great deal of time and produce
financial ta relief only gradually over that per-
iod of time.' 7
Finally, both municipalities made the mistake of over-
committing themselves financially in the negotiated sales
process. Though Watertown believes that it sought out the
only opportunity available for financial assistance (State
Urban Renewal), some participants hold that public needs
were never given serious consideration.2 8 There was and
is a need for public open space in the Arsenal area of Water-
town; a portion of the site could have been acquired as open
space, meeting the public need and reducing the acquisition
cost as well. Today, a participant in the New York case
feels that it might have been more feasible for the City not
to have purchased the Yard, arranging for purchase by a pri-
vate consortium instead. 29  Perhaps the City should have
turned down the GSA's invitation to purchase the site,
countering with an offer to take the outdated facilities off
of the Federal government's hands.
The conversion process continues to be a long way from
being smooth and equitable, but both New York and Watertown
have made important contributions to improving the process.
The next chapter will examine how Boston learned from the
mistakes of others and how their lessons shaped Boston's ap-
proach to the conversion of the Charlestown Nava Shipyard.
CHAPTER III
CONVERTING THE BOSTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
AT CHARLESTOWN TO CIVILIAN USES
The settlement of Charlestown, established in 1629, an-
tedates that of Boston by one year. Located across the Har-
bor from Boston on a peninsula formed by the mouths of the
Mystic and Charles Rivers, Charlestown has always been a
center for shipping activities. When the fledgling nation
appropriated $1,000,000 for the building of six Naval ves-
sels, Charlestown's waterfront was deemed most suitable for
the Navy's first shipyard. On June 17, 1800, the anniversary
of the Battle of Bunker Hill, the U. S. Navy entered into
what would be a 174-year relationship with Charlestown by
purchasing forty-three waterfront acres-at a cost of $39,214.
I. THE CHARLESTOWN COMMUNITY
The Navy Yard's influence on Charlestown has, to be
sure, been stronger than Charlestown's influence on the Navy
Yard. (See map, page 34). Woods and Kennedy, in Zone of
Emergence, describe this influence as follows:
To the social life of the district a peculiar qual-
ity was given by the proximity of the Navy Yard and
the intermingling of citizen and soldier. The of-
ficers at the Yard lived at the local hotels or in
houses of the town which they rented. Many of them
found their wives in Charlestown. Thus a semimili-
tary society grew up, and social rating cas to be
fixed according to one's rank in the Yard.
In the last seventy years, few of those employed at the Navy
Yard have resided in Charlestown. In 1905, "(v)ery few of
A.
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the men in the Navy Yard reside in the district, most of them
coming from all over greater Boston."31 In 1970, it was es-
timated that fewer than 300 of the Navy Yards nearly 5,500
employees Lived in Charlestown.3 2
Another influence of the Navy Yard on Charlestown has
been the vehicular traffic generated by the Yard. Particu-
larLy during World War II, the Yard's period of peak employ-
ment, many Townies realized extra revenue by operating park-
ing Lots. But the traffic has always been a greater pro-
blem than an advantage. At the close of a work day, Charles-
town's residential streets were sacrificed as Yard traffic,
scrambling to find a new or unused route to avoid the tie-
ups on arterials, created their own delays and traffic haz-
ards.
Residential land use predominates in Charlestown, with
large tracts of public housing ad private housing which is
primarily three-family wooden structures. Exceptions to the
latter lie in the vicinity of the Bunker Hill Monument. In-
dustry is located on Charlestown's periphery.
Charlestown is now being termed an "up and coming" neigh-
borhood. In the 1940's, the Navy's peak employment period,
the population of Charlestown was 42,000. This number stead-
ily decreased through the 1950's and 1960's to a low of between
10,000 and 11,000. In 1963, a General Neighborhood Renewal
Plan was prepared for Charlestown. Located across the Charles
River from the infamous West End Renewal Area, Charlestown
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residents were less than enthusiastic about such an event oc-
curring in their neighborhood. In 1966 skepticism was over-
come, compromises were reached and the urban renewal plan
for Charlestown was accepted. Because of its status as Fed-
eral property, the Navy Yard was not considered in the City's
plan.
Renewal had its physical beginning in the Late 1960's
and was accompanied by individual renovations. These com-
bined to enhance Charlestown's reputation as an urban neigh-
borhood. In the 1970's, Charlestown's Irish-Catholic blue
collar population has been growing with the recent influx of
white collar workers migrating back to the city.
Given its Irish-Catholic population, much of the commun-
ity activity centers around the church parishes, particularly
the three Catholic parishes of St. Mary's, St. Catherine's and
St. Francis. The churches provide many of the community's
social gatherings, including guilds and youth organizations.
The community groups which have had the greatest involve-
ment with the Navy Yard are the Charlestown Historical Soci-
ety and the smaller Charlestown Preservation Society. Mem-
berships of the two societies overlap and rather than com-
peting on the same issues, their activities and interests
complement each other. On a few occasions the Kennedy Cen-
ter has also been involved with the Navy Yard. A community
organization supported by the Federal Office of Economic Op-
portunity, the Kennedy Center provides social service pro-
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grams for the community, including employment programs, child
care and elderly programs.
Residents of Charlestown identify strongly with their
neighborhood. The common three-family residences strengthen
this identity, serving as "family" homes. It is not uncommon
for young married couples to occupy one of the apartments in
their parente' home.33
Under the jurisdiction of the Federal government, the
Navy Yard has always been administratively separated from the
Charlestown community. In 1950, the construction of the Miys-
tic River Bridge created a physical barrier between the Yard
and the community, separating the two even further. These
two barriers, together with the facts that relatively few
Charlestown residents were employed at the Yard and that few
Charlestown businesses were dependent upon base generated bus-
iness, meant that the community viewed the Navy Yard as Less
and Less a part of Charlestown.
II. EARLIER BOUTS WITH CLOSURE
Employees at the Charlestown Navy Shipyard had heard
rumors for thirty or forty years that the Navy was going to
close the Yard. The Boston Naval Shipyard at Charlestown
has been plagued every ten years or so with threats of clo-
sure since the 1930's when M1ayor Curley was talking about
fighting to keep the Yard open. In the 1950es the Hoover
Commission, urging decompetition with private industry, pro-
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vided the impetus for closing the Yard's historic ropewalk.
Heated congressional debates over the announced closure and a
related defense appropriations' rider resulted in a reprieval;
the ropewalk was spared. Again, in 1964, the year of the
Watertown and Brooklyn closures, operations at the Boston Na-
val Shipyard were reviewed.
The Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Portsmouth and Boston Navy
Shipyards had all been cited as "high-cost" yards in the De-
fense Departments shipyard study. The cost-savings which
could be effected through the closure were examined for each
Yard. This was a period of concern in Boston until it was
announced in November, 1964, that the Brooklyn Shipyard was
to be closed immediately. Portsmouth was to be phased out
over the next ten years and Charlestown and Philadelphia
were spared. There were immediate responses to the Boston
Naval Shipyard's near miss by those interested in its con-
tinued existence. Captain Jones of the Shipyard warned that
the installation must continue its current efficiency pro-
gram to avoid further cutbacks.93 At the Federal Level, the
Massachusetts delegation undertook action aimed at moderniz-
ing the facilities to insure a future demand for its opera-
tions and to make the Boston Naval Shipyard a key base in the
North Atlantic Defense System. City and community leaders
accepted the study and possible closing in stride. Their
view was that bases were alway being reviewed for efficiency
and cost-savings and a possible closure came along every de-
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cade or so to maintain efficient operations. With Brooklyn
and Portsmouth closed, they viewed Charlestown's future as
secure. The Charlestown Shipyard nc occupied a key position:
To close the Shipyard would leave the North Atlantic "defen-
seless".
Shortly after the encounter with the Defense Department,
the Charlestown Historical Society, increasingly aware of
the Navy Yard' historical value, began working toward national
recognition of this value. In 1966 it succeeded in having
the entire Charlestown Naval Shipyard declared a National His-
toric Landmark and listed on the Nat .onal Register of Histor-
ic Places. These designations indicated that the Yard was
considered to be of exceptional value to the country as a
whole and that any future development on the Yard must be
carried out with concern for the protection of buildings and
areas of vaLue.
The Historical Society became -involved with the historic
preservation of the Yard again in 1969. The seed of what was
to become a proposal for a National Park was sown in the Bos-
ton Globe, September, 1969, by Douglas Adams, a professor ac-
tive in historic preservation. He proposed a park for a por-
tion of the Navy Yard, centered around the U.S.S. Constitu-
tion which would interpret the entire Revolutionary War area,
explaining the continuity and interrelationships of the vari-
ous scenes of action.35 In November of 1969, the Charles-
town Historical Society, upon learning of negotiations be-
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tween the City and the Navy to have the USS Constitution moved
from Charlestown to a berth elsewhere in the City36, picked
up on the idea. The President of the Historical Society ap-
pointed a committee to work with the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA) to preserve the Charlestown Navy Yard as a
National Park. Within three days of the committee's creation
1,200 Charlestown residents had signed a petition in opposi-
tion to any move of the USS Constitution from Charlestown.
The BRA, at the request of the Society, drew up plans which
became the basis of the proposal for a National Historic Park.
Defense Department actions complemented the drive for a
National Historical Park. At the suggestion of the Massachu-
setts congressmen, the modernization of the Boston Naval Ship-
yard had been studied by engineering consultants in 1968.
These studies resulted in the recommendation that the opera-
tions of the Navy Yard be consolidated at the South Boston
Annex, the more modern of.the two facilities which compromised
the Boston Naval Shipyard. Acquired from the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts in 1920, the Annex occupied 180 acres of wa-
terfront land at the mouth of the Boston Inner Harbor. In
1970 it was announced that operations at Charlestown would
be moved to South Boston over a ten-year period, vacating
the Charlestown Yard by 1980. As the BRA began serious con-
sideration of what to do with the soon-to-be-vacated Shipyard,
the National Historical Park proposal gained support and mo-
mentum. By the end of 1970 it had found its way to Washington.
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III. RESPONSES TO THE
ANNOUNCEIENT OF CLOSURE 1973
Three years after the decision to consolidate operations
at the South Boston Annex and nine years after the last cio-
sure consideration, the closure was again discussed. Those
familiar with the history of the Shipyard and previous rumors
believed that such a decision could again be averted. The
Massachusetts delegation in Washington, D. C., held meetings
with each other,.with President Nixon and with Secretary of
Defense Richardson in an attempt to positively influence the
Defense Department's decision. In addition, Senator Edward
Kennedy filed a bill in Congress proposing a Military Instal-
lation Closing Commission to review and evaluate any decisions
of the Defense Department to close any military installation.
The measure, however, did not receive action in the 93rd Con-
gress, let alone in time to affect the fate of the Boston
Naval Shipyard.
The National Historical Park effort found itself in an
awkward position. Legislation pending in Washinton, D. C.,
required that activities for the Park be continued; the im-
pending closure of the Shipyard meant that these activities
might be misinterpretted as Lending support and encourage-
ment to deactiviation.
On April, 16, 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced
that five military installations in Massachusetts would be
closed: Otis Air Force Base, Westover Air Force Base,
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Chelsea Naval Hospital, and the Boston Naval Shipyard at Char-
lestown and South Boston. Responses to the announcement came
from every level of government, federal to community; responses
which varied in scope and focus.
The Massachusetts congressional delegation immediately
set to work to "ease the blow". Senators and representa-
tives of Massachusetts and Rhode Island met to discuss ways
of easing the economic impacts. For the Boston area these
had been predicted at $45 million per year. A special
Emergency Readjustment Commission, headed by Secretary of De-
fense Richardson, was created to study the economic impact
on the affected areas and to recommend Federal funding pro-
grams to alleviate those areas.
Where the traditional political response to such rumors
and announcements is to protest and make demands, the then
Governor of Massachusetts, Francis Sargent, was concerned
that his response be consistent with his position of cutting
back on defense spending.
I was torn between making a lot of noise hollering
about the loss of jobs and being consistent in my
position on defense spending. I was concerned a-
bout the closure and said that I was, but I did not
start a public relations campaign against it. In-
stead I approached Secretary of Defense Richardson
and asked him, 'Is there any way this decision
can be turned around?' When he replied no, that
it had all been decided, I was convinced that it
was best to presume that the decision was final.
From that point I began to consider what co d be
done to constructively reconvert the bases.
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On April 15, the day before the Defense Department made its
announcement, then Governor Sargent revealed a three-point
plan for dealing with base closures, should any of the Mas-
sachusetts bases be closed. The plan included: (1) going
after whatever Federal grants were available to ease the dol-
Lar impacts of closings; (2) seeking more manpower training
and retraining programs from the Federal government; and
(3) pressing the Nixon Administration for a firm committment
to support manpower programs with a willingness to aid, at
least in part, the industries for which the people were being
retrained 38
The Mayor or Boston designated the Economic Development
and Industrial Commission (EDICI headed by Gerald Bush, as
the City's lead agency in conversion planning. The Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA) was to provide continuous in-
put to conversion planning. The week after the plans to
close had been confirmed, the BRA disclosed its intentions
to approach the Defense Department for appropriations of up-
wards of $30 million to convert the Shipyard to a maritime
park and industrial center. This was based on the BRA's be-
lief that the most pressing and important need was to "get
several industries situated at the Shipyard in a complex with
a maritime park (focusing on the USS Constitution)." 39 These
intentions were modified when Mayor White announced that the
City was seeking a $430,000 Federal grant to fund eighteen
months of conversion planning. The EDIC and BRA were inter-
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ested in jointly commissioning a comprehensive land use study
to identify alternative concepts for the redevelopment of the
two sites. Three months later, the U.S. Economic Development
Administration made $80,000 avaiLable to the City for plan-
ning the conversion of the shipyard to civilian uses. The
BRA applied for a $280,000 grant from Housing and Urban De-
velopment to fund redevelopment planning.
Within a month of the announcement, State officials,
believing that it was better to approach the problems created
by closure through a formalized mechanism than through a
study group, established the Joint Commission on Federal Base
Conversion. The need for municipal as well as State involve-
ment was recognized and task forces were created for the
Boston/Chelsea area, Otis and Westover. Community advisory
committees were established in the communities of Chelsea,
Charlestown and South Boston to complement the Boston/Chelsea
Task Force. This break-down was to ensure that decisions on
retraining and re-use be made at the local level. Task forces
and advisory committees were to have a spread of members,
some being State appointed and the others city appointed.
The Governor assigned two of his top staff aides to assist
the Commission and he worked to provide the Commission with
the ability to and the funds necessary for functioning.
In the summer of 1973, Frank Zarb, Director of the Of-
fice of Management and Budget, and his troop of "flying Fed-
eral officials"40 flew to Boston to assist in the base ad-
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justment. Represented among the fourteen officials were the
Housing and Urban Development Department, Economic Develop-
ment Administration, National Park Service, Office of Econom-
ic Adjustment and Health, Education and Welfare. Serving as
the high level response to local outcries relating to the
April announcement, the team briefly viewed the situation and
designated the Office of Economic Adjustment within the De-
fense Department to serve as liaison and coordinator between
the planning agencies responsible for conversion and Federal
funding agencies.
Responses on the part of Federal, State and City organ-
izations laid the foundation for converting the Charlestown
Navy Yard to civilian uses. Through them a framework for in-
teraction and preliminary goals for re-use were established.
IV. RE-USE PROSPECTIVES
In the three years following the closure announcement,
the City has courted four major prospective developers for
the Charlestown site: the National Park Service, the Boston
Shipbuilding Corporation, the Kennedy Library Corporation, and
the major real estate firm - Societa Generale Immobliare of
Rome. (See map, page 46).
The National Historical Park. Planning for the Nation-
al Historical Park, to avoid being identified as favoring
closure, maintained a Low profile pending the realignment
decision. After the confirmation of closure, the activities
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re-surfaced. The CharLestown Historical and Preservation So-
cieties and the BRA resumed their planning efforts.
Those promoting the Park wanted to include within the
Park boundaries as many of the historic buildings as possi-
ble, particularly the 142-year old ropewalk. Despite their
efforts, when the final, Federally approved plan for the Park
was announced, it was limited to the USS Constitution and a
surrounding area of approximately twenty-seven acres. In-
cluded in the Park were a few historic structures, among them
the Commandant's house, but efforts to include the ropewalk
were unsuccessful. The National Historical Park became a
reaLity in 1974, as the Navy functions at the Yard ceased.
The USS Constitution and historic Charlestown are the
building blocks for the Navy Yard re-use. These visitor
attractions will increase the average length of stay per
visitor at the Navy Yard and which will, in turn, create a
greater demand for visitor services such as hotel accomoda-
tions, restaurants and shops. The National Historical Park
and the proximity to Charlestown constitute major building
blocks for stimulating private investment in the re-use and
development of the Navy Yard.
Boston Shipbuilding Corporation. At the outset of con-
version planning both EDIC and BRA saw re-use of the South
Boston and Charlestown sites as a private shipyard as the
most advantageous approach. It would minimize the public
sector investment in converting the sites by using the exist-
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ing facilities and would re-hire the shipbuilders which had
been laid off by the Navy. EDIC, not wanting to acquire the
combined 280 acres totally on speculation, was searching for
an anchor tenant to locate on the bulk of the property.4 1
In late 1973-early 1974, one materialized.
The Boston Shipbuilding Corporation was headed by Lloyd
Bergeson. His firm proposed to take over the total land and
water acreage of the South Boston Annex and 60 acres of the
Charlestown site, including the sheet metal, electrical and
steel forging shops, all of which were located on the water-
front. This would leave some 45 acres at Charlestown, those
containing all of the older industrial and warehouse build-
ings, and would remove the potential for housing, marina or
other waterfront uses at Charlestown. It was viewed by Ger-
ald Bush, EDIC Director, as a "real time" development.s42
The Corporation estimated that, if it did locate on the Ship-
yard sites, it would build over $200 million in ship orders
over a ten-year period and provide as many as 3,000 jobs for
shipbuilders.
However, before Boston Shipbuilding could make a firm
commitment to locate on the sites, it had to raise between
$285 million and $300 million in ship building contracts.
In March, 1974, three months before the Navy was sched-
uled to cease its operations on the Shipyard, Bush announced
that, with the assistance of the Federal Office of Economic
Adjustment, the City had been successful in getting assurances
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from the Department of Defense that the Shipyard would be left
intact to the extent necessary for Shipbuilding. While vague,
these assurances seemed explicit in comparison to the Navy's
prior reluctance to comment on its plans for the equipment.
The Charlestown community advisory committee recommended to
Mayor White that "every possible effort" to support the pro-
posal by Boston Shipbuilding to occupy South Boston and a
portion of Charlestown be continued.4 As a result, the May-
or moved to grant the firm a 120-day moratorium on other uses
for the Shipyard properties and pledged the City's coopera-
tion with the firm in advancing its plans.
By April, Boston Shipbuilding was estimated to have
nearly $100 million of the necessary contracts and was work-
ing to come up with $185 million more by July 1, 1974.44 it
also had the backing of city business leaders and the City's
four largest banks.45
Optimism over the re-use of the site was increasing. The
Shipbuilding Corporation as a major tenant would allow the
City's industrial park concept to get off the ground immedi-
ately since negotiations with GSA could be carried on while
the firm was occupying the site on an interim lease. The
City estimated a potential $100 million in new investment for
shipbuilding uses on the site and up to $3.6 million in new
property revenue yields.
A special report on the future of the Navy Yard was pub-
lished in the Globe three days before the complete closure of
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the Shipyard by the Navy. The Shipbuilding Corporation was
reported to have some $250 million worth of new ship construc-
tion contracts. But the report, attempting to view the real-
ities of the venture, warned that "(w)hile there is optimism
because of the shipbuilding offer, it still may be too early
to answer the question of whether the City will find itself
with a pair of white elephants or centers of potential pros-
perity.,,46 If the shipbuilding project did not jell, direc-
tions for the future development of the Boston Naval Shipyard
would come from a $29,000 consultant study which had been
commissioned jointly by the EDIC and BRA in mid-1973. The
study was being prepared by Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig Inc.,
Cambridge, and would be completed by mid-July, 1974.
In the fall of 1974, conversion planning for the Ship-
yard was modified. Boston Shipbuilding was having difficul-
ty obtaining sufficient financial committments. EDIC, given
its mandated interest in industrial development, was shifting
its focus to the industrially-oriented South Boston Annex,
leaving the BRA to plan for the Charlestown site. EDIC it-
self was forced to alter its approach when its director, Bush,
resigned. Finally, in early 1975, the shipbuilding firm
foundered due to insufficient financial backing and a col-
lapse of the world shipbuilding market. New directions for
development were sought in the alternatives identified by the
Wallace, Floyd, Ellenzweig study.
The Kennedy Library Corporation. The seeds of the next
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development proposal had been sown at the height of optimism
over the Boston Shipbuilding Corporation's proposal. In April,
1974, Stephen Smith, a member of the Kennedy Library Corpor-
ation, had made a visit to Boston to scout alternative sites
for the proposed Kennedy Library and Museum which was encoun-
tering resistance in Cambridge. Among the sites visited was
the Charlestown Navy Yard.
As the shipbuilding proposal faded, the community picked
up on the Kennedy Corporation's need for an alternative site.
The Charlestown community advisory committee had made a time-
ly recommendation that the BRA approach the Kennedy Corpora-
tion and offer the Charlestown Navy Yard as an alternative
site for the Museum (leaving the less controversial Library
Located in Cambridge).
There was some reluctance on the part of Charlestown
residents to abandon the shipbuilding proposal Ln support
of the Museum proposal. They saw the Kennedy Museum as an
exciting idea, but it did not serve to satisfy their major
concerns for redevelopment of the site. The employment to
be generated was minimal, certainly not the type which
Townies had hoped would locate on the Yard. The Museum would
not increase the tax base and 'finaLly, the tourist traffic
generated by the Museum was less desirable than heavy truck
traffic. The latter was at least confined to commercial
streets and had specific destinations. Tourist traffic would
probably meander all over Charlestown's residential streets
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while looking for the Museum and generally exploring the neigh-
borhood.
Nevertheless, when it became clear that the shipbuilding
proposal was futile, the entire community enthusiastically
threw its support behind the Kennedy Museum. The community
saw Charlestown as an appropriate location; after all, John
F. Kennedy had begun his political career representing Char-
lestown and the community saw the Museum as a monument to one
of its favorite sons. A petition drive was organized to
demonstrate community support of such a development and to
request that the Kennedy Museum locate at the Navy Yard. A
total of 3,000 signatures were collected, representing about
one-third of Charlestown's adult population.48 Members of
the Kennedy Center sent off letters to the Kennedy Library
Corporation in support of the Museum location in Charles-
town.
The BRA was officially designated as the City's lead a-
gency for the Charlestown Navy Yard in June, 1975. The month
before, the Kennedy Library Corporation had announced that it
had no more interest in the Cambridge site for the Museum.
The BRA's first action as lead agency was to offer a building
at Charlestown for the Kennedy Museum. For the next five
months, the BRA worked to make the Charlestown location as
attractive as possible to the Corporation. Detailed devel-
opment proposals were published4 9; plans for the entire Ship-
yard began to reflect the historical character of redevelop-
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ment; zoning changes were undertaken to reflect the new direc-
tion of re-use planning and the Navy was notified that the
City was no longer interested in the personal property on the
site related to shipbuilding. The State's cooperation was
sought and received. State actions relating to the redevel-
opment of the Yard were guaranteed top priority. These in-
cluded the State's Department of Public Works improvements to
site access, preparation of impact statements and the expe-
diting of all State reviews and actions relating to Yard re-
development. The BRAviewed the Kennedy Museum as the "icing
on the cake" for the redevelopment of the Charlestown Shipyard.
Then, in November, 1975, the blow was delivered; The
Kennedy Library and Museum were to be located at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts campus at Columbia Point, Boston. Though
the Charlestown Navy Yard did not benefit from the decision,
a momentum had been achieved for conversion planning and the
pledges for State assistance and cooperation which had been
obtained would not be rescinded.
Societa Generale Immobliare of Rome. Just as the Boston
Shipbuilding Corporation proposal faded into the Kennedy Mu-
seum proposal, the latter faded into a housing-hotel proposal.
At the close of 1975, the Societa Generale Immobliare of
Rome, an international real estate firm, retained an archi-
tect to prepare a plan for Locating a housing and hotel com-
plex on the Charlestown Navy Yard.5 In ApriL, 1976, nego-
tiations between the BRA and the real estate firm were made
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public by the Boston Globe.51 The $100 million, 103 acre de-
velopment would include 1,000 new housing units along the wa-
terfront, a 700-1,000 room hotel and recreational and park-
ing facilities. The rehabilitation of several of the his-
toric buildings would also be involved. The firm is currently
conducting reviews of the financial feasibility of such an un-
dertaking. Their proposal corresponds with one of the alter-
natives proposed by the consultant's in their land use study.
The City views this newest interest as large enough to
be an anchor tenant. That is, if the firm chooses to locate
on the Yard, their development will be large enough to justi-
fy.-the risk involved in the City's acquisition of the pro-
perty. Should the firm reach such a decision, the City will
have to exert pressure on the Federal agencies to expedite
the acquisition process.
The City has responded to each of the expressed interests
in turn, incorporating each systematically into its conver-
sion process. Unlike Watertown, which repeatedly undertook
new approaches to conversion, Boston has successfully applied
the momentum from earlier efforts to subsequent interests.
V. THE CITY'S PLANNING PROCESS
Prior to the April, 1973, announcement, very little
planning had been done which dealt with or related to the fu-
ture of the Charlestown Navy Yard. The City was permitted
zone, or in any other way make recommendations for or place
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controls on future re-use of the site, though it could not
compel the Federal occupant to comply. Yet Boston chose to
treat the Navy Yard as a void in the City. Planning was car-
ried on all around it, never dealing with it.
When the Urban Renewal Plan had been prepared for Char-
lestown, the Navy Yard was overlooked due to its Federal
status. As the situation now stands, it would be desirable
for the Yard to be included in the Charlestown Urban Renewal
Area so that renewal funds could be applied toward its rede-
velopment. Today, urban renewal is dead and administrative-
ly, it will be easier to spend the City's lag money on exist-
ing renewal areas such as the South End or the West End, fin-
ishing off existing projects rather than attempting to desig-
nate the Navy Yard as a renewal area. Had the administra-
tive details of including the Charlestown Navy Yard .in the
General Neighborhood Renewal Plan for Charlestown been car-
ried out in the mid-1960's, the City could now take the Lag
money and invest it there.
When the ten-year phase out for consolidation was an-
nounced in 1970, conversion planning by the City focused on
the National Historical Park. A study series prepared by the
BRA in 1970 cited development opportunities such as commer-
clal activity, residential uses, industrial uses and recrea-
tional use.52 The needs and unmet demands for these uses
were mentioned, but nothing more substantial supporting
such development. When site deactivation was re-sched-
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uled for 1974, these planning efforts were too superficial to
provide the City with immediate direction for the conversion
planning.
Regional planning efforts, in the form of a Harbor plan,
could have provided a context in which to consider the water-
front development of the Charlestown Navy Yard. As it is,
plans for the Navy Yard are being pushed ahead without any
special reference to planning for the Greater Boston shore-
Line. This is not a reflection on the BRA; nothing exists
to which it could refer in its planning. If the BRA were to
wait until a Harbor Plan were adopted by the Greater Boston
area, the precious momentum it still maintains on the Navy
Yard could be lost.53
In February, 1976, a Boston Harbor Act was introduced
in the Massachusetts State Legislature. If adopted, it would
establish a one-stop permitting procedure, greatly simpli-
fying the present permitting process which can involve - a
myriad of agencies from the Army Corps of Engineers to the
State's Division of Waterways. Where shoreline management
on the West Coast is aimed at controlling development, this
proposed legislation is aimed at expediting shoreline devel-
opment in Boston Harbor.54 It is not expected to be passed
this year, but it reflects the enlightened attitude of the re-
gion toward this resource.55
Given this lack of pre-planning on the part of the re-
gion as well as the City, the City had to start its planning
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efforts from scratch when the closure was announced. Per-
haps unconsciously, its strategy was aimed at avoiding mistakes
which predetermined the futures of the Brooklyn Shipyard and
the Watertown Arsenal.
Prior to serious consideration of acquisition, Boston
took an inventory of the buildings and utilities on the Navy
Yard, examining their age, condition and potential for fu-
ture use. The City commissioned a land use alternatives
study, a transportation access study and an engineering study
of the infrastructure. The City then prepared a marketing
analysis for each of the various development packages which
were identified in the consultant study. An acquisition
scheme to minimize public investment and speculative risk
has been devised which involves the following: -(i) applying
for all applicable public benefit discounts and (ii). keeping
GSA informed so that their appraisal will reflect the market-
ability of the site for the intended uses set forth in the
Land Use Plan, discounted by public and private sector re-
storation and improvement costs. Those areas which quali-
fled for public benefit discounts included thirty acres of
historic merit to be acquired for historic preservation and
twenty acres for public open space. (See map, page 58). The
former is proving to be a complicated procedure because of
the Archeology Department's (within the Federal Interior De-
partment) limited experience. All of its previous dealings
have been with a courthouse here, a post office there; never
from BRA "Planning and
Deve Lopment Program"
December, 1975
(
ACQUISITION AREAS
HISTORIC HOTEL HOUSING PARK SITE 8 LIGHT MANUFACTORING
AREA SITE AREA RECREATION AREA AREA ToTAL
LAND 29.6 8.3 15.4 , 8.9 3.7 66.1
DRY DOCKS 1.2 1.8 30
PIERS ..8 6.4 3.7 1019
WATER 5.2 12.1 5.2 .2 227
TOTAL 29.8 14.3 35.1 . 19.6 3.9 102.7
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anything approaching thirty acres. The Department is still
struggling to apply its one-building procedures to the en-
tire parcel. The fifty-three acres remaining after these dis-
counts will be acquired through the negotiated sale proce-
dure. The property, zoned waterfront industrial during oc-
cupation by the Navy, has been rezoned general business, a-
partments and light manufacturing to reflect re-use intentions
of the City. The Federal government is being used as an un-
official land bank periing City acquisition of the property.
This has worked to date because of the fragmentation of the
Federal government. Until the discounts are confirmed and
rezoning approved, neither the exact dimensions of the nego-
tiated sale property rr the highest potential use can be de-
fined. The City can not acquire the property without being
given a price and that price is dependent upon those defini-
tions. In the meantime, the Federal government is paying for
the protection and maintenance of the property which is es-
timated at $4 million per year.56 Ideally, a simultane-
ous transfer would occur with the City acquiring the property
and transferring it to a developer that same day.
The BRA, acoording to one source, has no intention of
using the Massachusetts Government Land Bank, if~it can be
avoided. It prefers to have the Federal government Land
bank it as long as possible. The BRA sees no monetary ad-
vantage to going through the State, when the costs of bor-
rowing from the Land Bank will have to pay for its opera-
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tions. The City could achieve the same ends by borrowing the
funds on its own. The idea of this being a Federally gener-
ated problem therefore let them land bank it is also advocated
at the City level.57 If the BRA does not move to purchase
the property when GSA submits a price to them, GSA threatens
to sell the property through the sealed bid procedure. The
City is tempted to responds Try it. Presumably, the price
submitted to the City will be the rock bottom figure...sealed
bid would certainly test that.
One of the major concerns of the Mayor and his staff
has been to determine the overhead and maintenance costs.
Where a capital investment can be spread over twenty years and
amortized, protection and maintenance costs can not. They
are immediate costs. The City is concerned about pro-rating
the costs and maintaining the cash flow. It is estimated
that an investment of $17.5 million of public monies for site
preparation will encourage the additional investment of
$82 million in private capital.58  Complete re-use of the
Charlestown Navy Yard is projected to occur over ten to twelve
years, with the heaviest public expenditures taking place in
the first three years.
This, then, is where the conversion of the Charlestown
Navy Yard to civilian use stands. Part II examines the fac-
tors which have influenced this outcome. Chapter IV focuses
on the role of public agencies: their goals, mandates and a-
bilities to interact. Chapter V examines those factors op-
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erating independently of public agencies and government insti-
tutions, particularly the demand for land in the North East.
Chapter VI discusses alternative courses of action for im-
proving the system of converting former military bases to
civilian uses.
PART II
DETERMINANTS OF A SUCCESSFUL CONVERSION
CHAPTER IV
PUBLIC AGENCIES AND SUCCESSFUL CONVERSION
In situations such as Charlestown, where many groups
from varying levels of government are involved, it must be
assumed that every agency will operate in its own self-inter-
est; working to achieve the goals which they were created to
achieve and to maximize their benefits. The agencies invol-
ved in the conversion at Charlestown are no exception. From
the federal to Local Level, each is acting on its own behalf.
Though the potential for inter-agency conflict and competi-
tion exists, there currently- exists a commonality of interest
among the agencies, allowing for cooperation and implementa-
tion of a conversion strategy. This chapter will examine the
agencies involved in conversion; the goals which they are in-
terested in achieving, the resources available to them for
meeting those goals, and the strategies which have been em-
ployed in that process.
I. FEDERAL AGENCIES
The primary federal agencies associated with converting
the Charlestown Navy Yard have been the Department of Defense,
the Office of Economic Adjustment, the Economic Development
Administration, and General Services Administration. From
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the municipal viewpoint, the federal agencies involved in the
disposal and conversiQn of surplus military property can be
divided into two general catagories: (i) the advocates - Of-
fice of Economic Adjustment and Economic Development Adminis-
tration - and (ii) the adversaries*- Defense and General Ser-
vices. This is not to say that either group has taken it up-
on themselves to champion or challenge municipal efforts in
conversion. Each agency has mandated goals and areas of op-
eration as well as statutory constraints on when and how it
can operate.
Department of Defense (DoD). Charged with providing for
the National defense, the Department's budget appropriations
are spent on defense contracts and maintainirg more than a
thousand military bases in countries all over the world. Its
budget is subject to the normal slow growth in congressional
appropriations as well as increasing criticism and opposi-
tion as the nation moves in to the post-Vietnam era.59 To
put its budget to the most efficient use means that bases
will be realigned and deactivated.
While operating within its budgetary constraints, DoD
has two discretionary powers which relate to conversion at
Charlestown: (1) determining the most efficient distribu-
tion of resources and (11) determining how a realignment will
be announced and carried out. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr&., in
defending the objectivity of DoD in the former determina-
tion, stated "that it would be 'immoral' to keep a shipyard
in operation because of the disastrous effect a closing might
have on an area's economy. He felt it immoral to spend de-
fense money which was not to be used 'in the real sense of
the word, for the nation's defense.'"60 However, based on
evaluations and recommeddations from earlier realignments,
DoD has progressively modified its realignment procedures. A
study of the base closings of 1964 found that
it can be concluded that to insure maximum recovery
and minimum deleterious effects on the community,
the closure actions should be done quickly and giv-
en considerable publicity, with prompt official re-
lease of a ailable information and future plans and
schedules.
This recommendation has been incorporated to a degree. DoD
has not yet forfeited all of its discretion in this area.
Those associated with bases must still speculate on their fu-
tures. Rumors of realignment provide food for thought which
are followed up, possibly months later, by official confirma-
tions of DoD intentions.
General Services Administration (GSA). As described in
Chapter I, GSA is the sole agency responsible for the dis-
posal of surplus federal property. It functions according to
the Federal Surplus Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949 and is, as was mentioned earlier, prohibitted by law
from being liberal in the disposal process. Neither statute
nor budget allows GSA to operate in a land banking capacity.
To operate within the limits of its budget appropriations de-
mands that GSA minimize the variable costs of disposal, such
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as protection and maintenance. Under these constraints, GSA
has defined objectives and strategies for achieving its pur-
pose which is to transfer property from one public body to
another.
GSA is first of all interested in some productive use
occurring on the property as soon as possible. The parti-
cular nature of the re-use is, theoretically, left up to the
choosing of the applicant and depends on what their interest
is, whether in realizing tax revenue or non-monetary public
benefit use. Contrary to this, GSA believes that it is to
the benefit of the public body to have that property not trans-
ferred under a public benefit discount disposed of for its
highest and best use. It interprets getting property back on
the public body's tax roles as maximizing that body's bene-
fit. GSA views itself as a monitor of the future use of the
property.
GSA cooperates with communities affected by closure to
the extent of teaching them their rights and identifying op-
tions which are available to them for conversion. It encour-
ages them to work up a program to meet their needs, reminding
them of the options: developing the site themselves or merely
receiving the taxes which would result from GSA's sale of the
property on the private market. GSA sees the appraisal of
the property's fair market value as providing the basis for
decisions as to the methods of disposal likely to produce the
best results.
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Without funds for protection and maintenance the value of
the surplus property decreases rapidly as deterioration in-
creases. Budgetary constraints require GSA to adhere to time
schedules. All requests for time extensions are viewed ex-
tremely carefully. There is always the possibility of this
being interpretted as pressure to rush into acquisition. But
GSA can not wait on a community to organize for a decision.
If GSA determines the amount of time requested by a public
body is unreasonable, a private sale must be undertaken.
Federal property procedures have become more liberal with
respect to civilian take-over of former military property.
In addition to public benefit discount amendments, interim
leases allow earlier access to the real estate and it is not
unusual for a community to receive permission to keep person-
al property in place to speed the start-up of civil-ian acti-
vities. But just as there are limits to the amount of dis-
cretion which DoD will forfeit, GSA believes that there are
limits to the methods of public benefit discounting. In par-
ticular, GSA sees its role, of use monitoring and property
transfer, if not its existence, threatened by Congressman
O'Neill's proposal to allow up to a 75% discount for economic
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development.
Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA)and the President's
Economic Adjustment Committee-(EAC). The Federal government
has increasingly perceived that realignments will often have
serious impacts on the individuals affected, local and state
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agencies involved and the region's economy. As a result, the
OEA was established in 1961 within the Defense Department. It
has grown from a staff of one in 1961 to a staff of thirty-
three, including regional staff. The adjustment process was
strengthened again in March, 1970, 'by the formation of the
President's Economic Adjustment Committee.
OEA, complemented by EAC, exists to "help communities
help themselves." Where DoD moves money in the form of de-
fense contracts and GSA moves property, OEA moves advice. It
has no funds with which to offer assistance and no authority
to direct other federal agencies to take needed action. It
must depend on its position in DoD (and EAC under the Presi-
dent) to lend weight to its advice and on its ability to func-
tion as a liaison, communicator, educator and advocate, to
give its existence meaning. It can not initiate action; it
must wait until called upon by a state or community to re-
spond.
Although the intent of the agency is to be helpful,
states and localities at times find it especially difficult
to work with because its role in adjustment is an amorphous
one.6 5 OEA's position within DoD is at times a disadvantage,
at times advantageous. It is a drawback when the community's
feelings toward DoD are negative causing them to view OEA
with suspicion. It is an advantage when being on the inside
of the agency which necessitates the adjustment facilitates
cutting across service lines within that agency.
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Economic Development Adminstration (EDA). Complementing
the adjustment advice and advocacy available from OEA is the
financiaL assistance avaliable from EDA. Though its function-
ing is not limited to economic adjustment necessitated.by
military base realignments, it is one of the most important
agencies in that economic adjustment due to the particular
tools which it possesses through legislation. The first tool
is its planning and technical assistance granting capability.
This provides the opportunity for obtaining economic develop-
ment expertise at the local level. In Boston, EDA made near-
ly $500,000 available for conversion planning. The second
tool is its grant assistance for infrastructure work. This
is provided in the form of public works grants. The BRA has
recently applied for a grant of $3 million to assist with
street development, access and demolition of certain build-
ings at the Charlestown Navy Yard. Finally, EDA has a busi-
ness loan program. It is designed to encourage new businesses
and the expansion of existing ones. It has not been utilized
at the Navy Yard because conversion has not proceeded to that
point yet.
Other Federal agencies involved. Other federal agencies
have been involved in the process at times. For example, the
National Park Service has been involved with conversion due
to the creation of the National Historical Park. HUD provided
701 planning assistance funding to the City and may be invol-
ved in a land transfer for the housing portion of the site.
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The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation reviews applications for and
recommends conveyances of property for open space and histor-
ic monuments under public benefit discount amendments.
II. STATE AGENCIES AND ACTORS
Congressional Delegation . Where OEA must refrain from
acting as a community advocate and advisor until it is called
upon, the congressional delegates are elected to serve as com-
munity advocates. It is in their best interest to take the
initiative in championing the local cause because it is an im-
portant aspect of their goal fulfillment: to work for career
development and to maintain a constituency as well as visibil-
ity. They can assist the community in its efforts in a num-
ber of ways. These include: drafting Legislation; lending
visibility to the problem and bringing it to the attention of
those with resources to alleviate the situation; informing
federal officials of community concerns; securing positions of
power such as committee chairmenships; establishing a record
of consistency; and finally, cutting through specific instances
of federal red-tape.
Current actions by the delegation which are relevant to
the Charlestown Navy Yard include O'Neill's proposed legisla-
tion and cutting through red-tape.
Governor's Office. Then Governor Sargent defined his
role in conversion as follows: (i) establishing a formal
mechanism for community-state interaction; (ii) selecting
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good, experienced people to operate it; (iii) provide the mech-
anism with backing, both financial and political, making top
staff aides available; and (iv) giving them the ability to
function, avoiding hemming them in. He saw himself keeping
the feet of federal officials to the fire to respond to state
and community concerns as expressed through the mechanism.67
Former Governor Sargent was constrained in his actions
by his constituency. He was personally interested in acting
responsibly, constructively and consistently.
It is easy to protest and make demands, he said,
plus it receives coverage by the media. But I was
uneasy about joining the noisy response of the e-
lected officials...I beLieve that proceeding from
the announcement and creating the State Commission
was the responsible thing to do, though maybe not
the best political move
However, had his approach to conversion been successful, his
abilities would have been confirmed and the move would have
been politically successful.
Joint Commission on Federal Base Conversion. The Com-
mission was created by the Legislature in April, 1973, to
serve "as a catalyst in setting up a full scale conversion
program" eventually phasing out of existence.69 The Commis-
sion had twenty-one members, among them Leading citizens and
legislators as well as representatives of the affected com-
munities of Otis, Westover, Chelsea, South Boston and Charles-
town. Seven members were from the House of Representatives,
three from the Senate and eleven persons were appointed by the
Governor.
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The existence of community mechanisms for defining goals
and making decisions was acknowledged.
The Commission determined that state government de-
cisions about civilian use of the former defense
properties should be subordinate to local decisions.70
The Commission was not intended to add another level of bu-
reaucracy. Rather, it was intended to serve as a go-between,
a liaison between the community and the federal levels as well
as a clearinghouse for state agency interests in the bases
and their proposals for re-use. It was to play a procedural
role workirg with communities on their goal definition and on
the technical aspects of conversion. Where the Commission
started out with visions of "enabling" and guiding the pro-
cess, it ended up playing a neutral, technical role.
The Commission initially insisted on a coordinated
approach, dealing with all federal agencies at
once. It was eventually agreed that...each base
or area would submit its own application for fed-
eral planning funds. The State would apply for ad-
ditional federal fund to research issues which cut
across several bases.
Local task forces were mandated for the municipalities,
complemented by community advisory committees in Charlestown
and South Boston. The task forces, under the State's plan,
were to develop the comprehensive plans for conversion.
The State's formal mechanism worked best in every commu-
ity except Boston. Boston had an existing structure of elect-
ed and appointed officials to deal with the situation and al-
ready had the staff experience-and organization necessary to
approach such a complex problem. The Commission respected the
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City's attitude of "Don't call us, we'll call you" and served
a back-up role in Boston. Though it was not the single mov-
ing force in problem solving in Boston, as it was elsewhere,
it was instrumental in bringing parties together. It was able
to provide assistance to Boston in at least four instances.
1) It clearly and specifically defined situations to the
State's delegates in Washington, D.C., so that they, in turn,
could put pressure on the appropriate federal agencies; 2) It
clarified environmental issues of the bases and assisted with
the impact statements; 3) It assisted in clarifying and coor-
dinating transportation issues; and 4) It served as a clear-
inghouse for re-use proposals from State agencies.72
At the end of 1975, the Commission's enabling legislation
expired. Out of it grew the Massachusetts Government Land
Bank.
Massachusetts Government Land Bank. Established in Jan-
uary, 1976, it consists of two professional staff members,
one secretary and a nine-member Land Bank Board. It is au-
thorized to use State funds to purchase and hold for five
years, the bases in Westover, Chelsea and Boston. During
the five years, the municipality is allowed to -improve the site
and sell any parcels in conformance with the agreement of
both the municipalLty and the Bank. Proceeds from the sale
of land must be shared between the municipality and the Bank
proportional with the investment of each entity. The muni-
cipality would at the end of the five years agree to acquire
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all unsold Land in the new development area. The municipali-
ty would also have the right to acquire any land parcels from
the Land Bank during the five years. The State appropriations
for the Land Bank will only cover the costs of property acqui-
sition. The municipal interest payments must cover the oper-
ating costs of the Bank. The purpose of the Land Bank is to
be used. There is some concern that Boston's Redevelopment
Authority, the City's lead agency for the Charlestown Navy
Yard, is unaware of the Land Bank's intentions to be used.7 3
Boston/Chelsea Task Force. This Task Force was estab-
lished in the State Commission Legislation to serve as the
focus for planning the conversion process, making conversion
decisions-at the local level. An attempt was made to include
local interests, appropriate local officials and state legis-
lators on the task forces.
Boston's Task Force suffered from a lack of role defini-
tion and from insufficient authority to act for the communi-
ty. Though community and state leaders were included in its
membership, it was not clear what the Task Force was to do
given that City agencies were approaching the situation of
conversion with skill. After a few meetings, the Task Force
was disbanded.
III. CITY AGENCIES
When federal officials made their visit to Boston in the
summer of 1973, the City was less than appreciative of their
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"helpful" gesture. City agencies such as EDIC and BRA took
offense at federal off.icials dropping in and making sugges-
tions as to how they could best approach the problem Boston
agencies were organized and qualified to handle the conversion,
possessing skilL in large scale redevelopment, in community
participation, in tapping federal resources and in avoiding
the mistakes of others.
Economic Development and.Industrial Commission (EDIC).
Though concerned only with the South Boston Annex now, until
June, 1975, EDIC was the City's official lead agency for con-
version of Charlestown, too. As its name indicates, its man-
date is to attract industry to Boston, serving as an economic
development agency.
In 1973, Director Bush announced his biases in the re-
deveLopment of the Boston Naval Shipyard. "Better Gillette
than the Navy."7 He felt that the underuse of industrial
land, especially where industrial land is scarce, is a sin,75
noting that the Navy Yard had been underused for years and
that there was a need for more industrial land in Boston.
Bush resigned in late 19 74 and since then EDIC has been
concentrating on redevelopment of the Annex, now known as the
Boston Marine Industrial Park. Briefly, EDIC's goals and
objectives for the Industrial Park are: to attract the max-
imum number of jobs and to run a break-even operation by at-
tracting industry to the site and through careful cost-accoun-
tingi to achieve the coordination among City departments neces-
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sary to allow EDIC to seize every opportunity that comes by.
Director Michael Westgate stresses that a knowledge of the mar-
ket is required because development ofthe Park is dependent
on those companies which would be suitable tenants seeing an
opportunity in terms of their market.
In acquiring the site, EDIC has been primarily interest-
ed in minimizing the risk involved. Their original method for
this was to acquire an anchor tenant to develop most of the
site. Boston Shipbuilding Corporation was to serve this
function. Now EDIC intends to use the Land Bank to purchase
the facilities.
Boston RedeveLopment Authority (BRA). BRA was formally
designated lead agency for conversion of the Charlestown
Navy Yard in June, 1975. The OEA and State Commission were to
assist BRA in the conversion process by providing them with
the expertise and political connections. Both offered a co-
ordinating capacity which BRA utilized. Initially, BRA was
unable to determine how the varying forms of assistance
should be incorporated. It was faced with a dilemmas with
whom should it align to insure the most benefits in federal
grants? Or, should it stick with tried and true pipelines?
The strategy which developed was mixed. The City's pipe-
lines were used for approaching HUD and EDA; OEA for matters
relating to the Navy and the Navy's control of the site. The
Commission was ancillary to these.
BRA's primary goal in conversion, not made explicit in
76
the planning for Charlestown due to its universality, is to
minimize risk. Any organization tends to avoid uncertainty
in planning for the future and BRA is no exception.76 This
objective has meant that BRA must work to minimize public sec-
tor investment in redeveLopment. In order to achieve the
goal, BRA has applied for federal monetary assistance. The
strings attached to these funds play an important role in de-
termining what activities will occur on the site. Where pro-
grams- such as public benefit discounts, were designed to al-
low local needs to be defined in non-profit terms, they in-
stead provide the incentive to define needs in terms of the
aid available.
In the BRA's published planning and development program
for the Charlestown Navy Yard7 7 its development goals are e-
numerated. (1) create new jobs for Boston residents;
(2) generate large scale capital investment in Boston and in-
crease the City's tax base; (3) take advantage of the water-
front Location; (4) relate development to the needs of the
Charlestown community; (5) meet part of the City's critical
need for new housing; and (6) protect, as far as possible,
the architectural, historicaL and environmental characteris-
tics of the site. There is potential for these goals to con-
flict at the point of implementation. The re-use plan, how-
ever, is only a statement of what the City would like to see
developed. It is not a firm, fast outline for development.
Since the development program is non-binding, BRA can keep
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aLL involved with the site satisfied by incorporating their
desires into present goals and objectives. This is not un-
reasonable in Light of the fact that it is difficult to set
priorities when there is nothing to focus them on. As -con-
crete proposals are made, a basis for eliminating some goals
and espousing others is provided. When proposals such as the
Kennedy Museum come along which satisfy only a few goals, the
City justifies them on the grounds that they will round out
development, free other land in the City for taxable uses and
employment purposes and minimize public sector investment.
BRA acknowledges the unfeasibility of maximizing both
tax yield and employment. The City therefore views them in-
terchangeably and is, theoretically, willing to substitute
one for the other. In fact, the City is not willing to ex-
change taxes for jobs. Should Boston have to decide between
subsidizing jobs or a tax generating use, the latter will tri-
umph. Development subsidies occur when the City invests more
in the acquisition and preparation of a site than a group is
willing to pay to locate on it. There is not a development
in the City that is not subsidized in some form or another.78
But such subsidies are rationalized by projecting tax yields
to demonstrate that the City will recover its investment.
This rationale can not be applied to employment generating
developments. In facing the trade-offs - absorbing land
costs to create jobs, taking an actual cash loss to susidize
jobs - there is no reassurance, such as tax yield projec-
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tions, that the City wilL benefit. This was one of the stum-
bling blocks for the shipbuilding venture - the City was not
willing to take on the risk to generate jobs.7 9 Thus, in its
approach to conversion the BRA is concerned about minimizing
the risk which it wishes to impose upon the future. It is
achieving this by Leaving the other goals flexible and by ac-
quiring the site the least-cost route.
IV. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTORS
In the community, there were two types of involvement
formal and informal. The former was the State's community
advisory committee and the latter consisted of community
groups and individuals.
Community Advisory Committee (CAC). A sub-group of the
State Commission Task Force, the CAC included representa-
tives of community interest groups: community organiza-
tions, local businesses and the shipbuilders union, among
others. Like the Boston Task Force, the CAC suffered from a
lack of role definition and opinions on its success vary.
The former manager of the Charlestown Little City Hall, an
organization which played an ex-officio role in the process,
believes the committee was able to provide concrete input to
conversion planning and did not exist merely to rubber stamp
City and Federal proposals. He infers from the lengthy and
well-attended meetings that the committee viewed its role as
important.8 0 While it is true that the suggestion to offer
79
the site to the Kennedy Library Corporation came from the com-
mittee, another local leader feels that the committee did not
give the community any better handle on controlling the devel-
opment of the Navy Yard than it had on its own. Committee
members expressed their opinions arid feelings, but there was
no power invested in the committee to act on any of the op-
inions.8 1 The role of the committee was also limited by the
length and complexity of the redevelopment process.
Community Groups and Individuals. A long history of ex-
ploitation by government agencies of all types, has led
Townies to be suspicious of any public project contemplated
in their community. A number of community watchdogs exist,
such as the Preservation Society's Navy Yard Committee, to keep
track of the development of the Yard. They are concerned a-
bout its compatibility with the community goals of minimizing
adverse impacts on the community, particularly vehicular
traffic, and providing job opportunities to match the skills
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and needs of the Charlestown Labor force. If a proposal
is made which the community or a community group does not
agree with, objections are raised. In the case of the Ken-
nedy Museum, the community voiced its attitude toward the po-
tential traffic. To date, opposition has been minimal; de-
velopment on the Navy Yard has not been a threat to the com-
munity. Townies have let the City know that Charlestown will
oppose a proposal for subsidized or high-rise housing on the
site. Over the years, Charlestown has finally developed suf-
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ficient political base to insist that community Uinpacts be
considered.
V. CAN THEY ACHIEVE A "SUCCESSFUL" CONVERSION?
Given that these are the backgrounds, objectives, re-
sources and strategies of the public groups involved, what
are the prospects for the cooperation necessary to implement
a conversion strategy?
The latest Federal study of base closings outlines a
four-part formula for "successful" conversion.
1. a community with spirited local leadership and will-
ing to rise to the challenge usually can accomplish
its objectives;
2. by following the advice of professionals who have
worked with others in similar situations, a commun-
ity can save time, money, trouble and tempers;
3. comparatively few dollars, when used to support a
well-drawn recovery strategy which shows where to
go and how to get there, pay greater dividends than
a fortune thrown at random into a crisis situation;
and
4. the best and fastest economic progress occurs when
federal, state, and local governments work in close
cooperation with the private sector.
The first three of these have been met; the fourth, coopera-
tion, is being strived for. Cooperation among actors is
necessary for the implementation of a conversion strategy.
The degree of dooperation at any time will depend on the de-
gree to which group interests are common interests. To date,
some interests have been satisfied, others have not. Re-
viewing briefly where each group stands as far as meeting its
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interests:
DoD's interest was met in the deactiviation of the Boston
Naval Shipyard;
OEA's was met when it was called upon by BRA to provide
assistance;
EDA and other federal agencies have been able to trans-
fer funds from donor to recipient;
Congressional deLegation has responded to the concerns
of its constituency;
State Commission, task forces and community advisory
committees ceased to exist when their enabling
legislation expired.
Four groups remain whose interests have not been satisfied:
GSA is working toward realizing reasonable returns from
the sale of the property;
Land Bank has intentions of being utilized;
Community has voiced its desires and concerns and is
waiting for a proposal to whLch it can respond; and
BRA has done the research necessary to determine its in-
terest in the site. It is now awaiting.an anchor
tenant to justify its acquisition of the property.
The Kennedy Museum activities demonstrated that, given
the impetus in the form of a prospective tenant, the four
groups remaining could cooperate. For the public agencies and
groups involved in conversion, the point of optimum coopera-
tion is at hand. It will be passed when GSA gLves BRA a
price and BRA attempts to continue its informal federal land
banking through delay, avoiding utilization of the State's
Land Bank. After that, implementation of a conversion effort
will become more complicated.
But, the four-part formula is said to lead to "success-
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ful" conversion and President Ford writes in the forward to
the study that "the key to successful recoveries is the dedi-
cation and determination at the 'grass roots''Level." What
is a successful conversion? At the federal level it is de-
fined as re-using the former base to meet social and/or econo-
mic needs. At the municipal level it is defined as the ability
of the community to re-coup its investment. In addition to
the four requirements identified by the federal government,
for the municipality, successful conversion hinges on an ad-
ditional prerequisite being met: the intended re-use, in this
case, the re-use on which the appraisal and price are based,
must locate promptly on the property. Boston has been for-
tunate in having experienced individuals involved in conver-.
sion: people who were aware of the importance of reviewing
the alternatives prior to considering and accepting the nego-
tiated sale method of acquisition. The staff of the BRA has
worked to reduce the acquisition cost as much as possible, but
it has not eliminated it. Fifty-three acres are currently
being appraised based on their "highest and best use for which
there is a current market."
In the existing system, unless the entire site is ac-
quired through public benefit discount transfers, BRA can not
eliminate the requirement for prompt private sector cooper-
ation. Nevertheless, because it lies beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the institutional system, it can not be identified as
a key to conversion and its importance is neglected by the
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federal studies.
As the process for surplus military property conversion
exists at present, it is not self-sufficient. The mistake is
that actors must operate as if it is. As a result, federal
officials blame local officials and Local officials blame fed-
eral officials for the failure of conversi.on efforts. From
one camp is heard: "Defense Department officials...blame
local stumbling blocks." 8 5 From the other: "Federal over-
pricing has doomed every urban base conversion in recent de-
cades to, at best, half success."86 The fact is that, de-
spite the activities of groups presently involved, the list of
actors is incomplete. There is a group to provide the pro-
perty (DoD), a group to move the property (GSA), groups to
advise and assist (OEA, EDA, State Commission and community),
groups to acquire it (BRA and State Land Bank), but no group
desirous of using it other than for certain public uses. Thus,
the process lacks meaning and direction. The success and
failure of it are, to a degree, independent of how it oper-
ates. "Perhaps the principal factor in the process of suc-
cessful community adjustment to defense expenditure and man-
power reductions, however, is a vigorous regional economy." 7
The next chapter will examine the prospects for a "suc-
cessful" conversion at Charlestown. That is, prompt, voLun-
tary cooperation on the part of the private sector to help
achieve the highest and best use of the property.
CHAPTER V
THE ACTUAL DETERMINANTS
It was said of the 1964 adjustments to realignment that
(t)he general level of economic activity in the Na-
tion may well account for a major portion of the suc-
cess that these communities have had in offsetting
the effects of the installation closures. The ad-
justment experiences might have been significantly
diffegnt had the national economy been less ro-
bust.
and later,
The community impact story described may tend to
lead formulators of public policy to a sense of
complacency; this is only possible in the situa-
tion of rapidly rising economic activity and a full
employment situation. The story may have been
quite different had the National economy in 1964-
1967 been significantLy less robust.09
In 1973-1976, the National economy was Less robust, and
the New England economy even less so. Unemployment in Mas-
sachusetts remains above the National average and newspaper
headlines read: "Massachusetts Left behind in US economic
takeoff."90 The conversion to civilian use of the Charles-
town Navy Yard can not be considered outside of the regional
economy. This chapter will Look at what the site has to of-
fer that is generally considered economically desirable, how
these advantages compare to other sites in the region and what
happens when the site is compared on the national level. Out
of this will come a sense of the economic potentials, the ac-
tual highest and best use for which there is a current mar-
ket, for the Charlestown site. Theoretically, the GSA fair
market value accounts for all of these characteristics in its
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appraisal. There is, however, some question about whether
this system takes into account those characteristics of the
land market which are a part of the private real estate ex-
change system.
I. THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE - SHIPBUILDING
Initially, Boston's agencies and officials saw the most
advantageous conversion of the Boston Shipyard to be from a
public to a private shipyard. Boston Shipbuilding Corpora-
tion materialized and proposed to devote South Boston Annex
and a portion of Charlestown to shipbuilding. It success-
fully acquired $250 million in contracts but was unable to
find the $300 million commitment necessary to make its pro-
posal financialLy feasible. Some officials say that the Cor-
poration was hampered by the delay of federal agencies in
setting a price 91; others say that Boston Shipbuilding failed
because the City is more committed to tax generating than job
generating uses.92 The reality of the situation is that
Boston Shipbuilding faiLed because the bottom fell out of the
world shipbuilding market. In Japanese shipyards, prices
quoted today are one-quarter what they were two years ago.
Thus, even if Boston Shipbuilding had located on the Ship-
yard sites, it would probably have no business today due to
the 75% drop in Japanese prices.93
The collapsed market eliminates shipbuilding as the high-
est and best use, but what about using the property for ship
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repair? A portion of the South Boston Annex is being devoted
to ship repair. With this comparatively small fraction of the
total Boston Naval Shipyard being put to such use, local ship
repair firms have become concerned that unfair competition on
the part of the City will put them out of business. The
demand for ship repair in the region is not great enough to
support 280 acres of municipal ship repair facilities in ad-
dition to the private shipyards already in existence.
Thus, neither shipbuilding nor ship repair qualify as
the highest and best use for which there is a current market.
II. THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE - INDUSTRIAL USES
Given that shipbuiLding/ship repair, the re-use requiring
the least investment in site preparation, is unfeasible, con-
verting an industrial facility from public to private use was
the City's next least-cost alternative.
The State Commission, aware of the need for private sec-
tor involvement in conversion, prepared a promotional booklet
on the Massachusetts bases and distributed it nationally.
"Federal Bases in Massachusetts: A Remarkable Development Op-
portunity" listed the attractive characteristids for each of
the bases. For Charlestown these included:
* 84 acres centrally located along Boston's inner harbor;
* 65 structures, 2 drydocks; about 3-5 million square
feet of enclosed space;
* 10 minutes from Logan International Airport, the
world's eighth busiest;
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* immediate access to major interstate highway system;
* 5 minutes from downtown Boston;
* rail facilities throughout the site;
* a large and varied work force available in the area;
* public transportation to the site; and
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* excellent water access for barge and cargo carriers .
All are desirable attributes for an industrial parcel - until
a closer examination is made.
The size of the parcel immediately Limits the types of
industrial uses potentially interested in the location ,to
those companies which can afford to develop the entire parcel,
those .uses, such as warehousing, which are not concerned a-
bout neighboring uses, or to a firm or agency interested in
ensuring the compatability of uses by preparing a development
scheme for the property.
The sixty-five structures are, in actuality, more of a
deterrent than an incentive to industrial location on the
site. An industrial survey carried out in 1970 by EDIC and
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BRA noted that new production processes require structures
different from the types which exist in the City. Further-
more, as was confirmed in New York on the Brooklyn Shipyard,
developers are more interested in a cleared tract of land
than in obsolete structures.
Though the Charlestown property abuts a major interstate
highway system, access to that system from the Yard is circu-
itous and involves winding through residential streets. The
88
fact that the site is five minutes from downtown Boston also
carries with it the general accessibility problems caused by
central city congestion.
Excellent water access for barge and cargo carriers
would be an asset if the Chariestown.Shipyard were Located in
Halifax, Nova Scotia, or New York. As it is, located in Bos-
ton, water access is a limited industrial asset. Charlestown
has never been seriously considered by MassPort for meeting
the regional shipping needs.97 Even if the Port were expand-
ing, the limited back-up space and staging area at Charles-
town would preclude its consideration.
If an industry is attracted to the large and varied work
force mentioned, locating on the Navy Yard is not a prerequi-
site for utilizing it. The work force is available throughout
the region, not just at Charlestown. While it may be a reason
for locating within the region, it is not a reason for loca-
ting specifically at Charlestown. There are many more de-
sirable industrial locations in the area which can draw on
this available labor pools sites which, though they may not
offer water access, have rail access, immediate access to the
interstate system, are less intensively developed - offering
interested tenants the opportunity to begin with modern struc-
tures tailored to their needs - and parcels varying in size
and location to meet any industrial needs.
While Charlestown has its industrial drawbacks, if the
regional demand existed, Charlestown could be appropriate for
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industrial re-use. There are a number of national trends,
however, which indicate that the regional demand for indus-
trial land will not be great enough over the next couple of
decades to justify converting the Charlestown Navy Yard to
industrial use at present.
The trend most clearly illustrated in the closure of the
Charlestown base is the shift in National policy. During the
Vietnam war, Massachusetts' economic outlook was temporarily
improved. In the mid-60's greater than 10% of the nation's
war contracts, mostly those for research and development,
and of funds for the burgeoning space-exploration industry
came into New England. Much of that came to Massachusetts.98
Then, with the ending of the Vietnam war, Federal priorities
were reordered. The cutbacks in space spending and the clos-
ing of military bases severely affected some Iassachusetts
industries and enlarged the pool of unemployed workers.
'Looking back today,' said the New England Regional
Commission in November, 1975, 'there is little
doubt that strong defense and space spending con-
tributed significantly to the improved economic
situation in New England.'99
Nor has Massachusetts seen the last of the federal cutbacks.
April, 1976, witnessed a 92% reduction in personnel at Fort
Devens in Ayer, Massachusetts. Recent warnings from the Stan-
ford Research Institute are that the outlook for the US de-
fense industry during the next few years is one of survival
of the fittest. Of Massachusetts' industry they said, "Your
route 128 electronics firms will undoubtedly be among the
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areas affected."f00
Since the 1920'st industry has been Leaving Massachusetts,
many of the firms moving to the South. Today that trend con-
tinues, reinforced by increasing federal spending in the Sun-
belt. The Sunbelt consists of fourteen southern states and
southern California and is described as "where the action is." 10 1
The region's share of federal funds has risen from 35% in
1960 to greater than 40% in 1975 in prime military contracts
alone. The area accomodates more than 140 installations, more
than the rest of the country combined.102 Increasing federal
investment in the Sunbelt is complemented by increases in the
region's share of industry. A number of Sunbelt characteris-
tics are identified as attracting increasing investment and
industry from the North to the South& big government with
its regulations, red tape, bureaucracy and taxes is freely
fought; public and private institutions, since they are new,
are neither as fixed nor as stratified as in the older North;
the climate is pleasant; the cost of living is low; labor
unions are relatively weak; the energy and raw materials are
there; the ports are there; and perhaps, most important, there
is room to grow.10 3
In attempting to reverse this trend Massachusetts is
nearly helpless. It is unable to change its weather, it can
not become young again and it can not guarantee room to grow,
politically passive Labor, readily available raw materials or
a low cost of living. The only action left to take to counter-
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balance these trends is to improve the State's institutional
and jurisdictional climate. In the South, it is said, big
government, with its regulations, red tape, bureaucracy and
taxes is freely fought. In the North they try to mimic:
The state is stiLl 'anti-business' claims the bus-
iness fraternity and the state in turn denies the
claim...But any improvement in business wilL have
to depend on what happens to state taxes, govern-
mental restrictions and regulations and a supply 104
and cost of money for borrowing, the experts say.
Or,
Herculean efforts by the state are imperative to
reverse this situation with a comprehensive pro-
gram of tax incentives and attractive financing,
not just to lure new industry, but most important-
Ly, to retain the existing companies...Industry
incentives for our state should be the by-word
for 1976. 5
And, regarding Charlestown, "officials are uncertain as to
how much incentives are needed for industry to locate
here...o"106
The evidence that these incentives actually attract in-
dustry is that they do not. Bennett Harrison and Sandra
Kanter, in a recent study, onnclude that "empirical studies...
provide little or no evidence that business decisions are in-
fluenced by these incentives."107 The more important loca-
tionaL considerations are the availability of basic resources,
adequate transportation access and politically passive Labor
force; those areas which the State has little power to affect.
Given the lack of interest on the part of the private
sector, national trends in industrial location and the inabil-
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ity of state and local governments to influence these trends,
the highest and best use for which there is a market for the
Navy Yard will not be industry.
III. THE HIGHEST AND BEST USE - RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL
With a less than optimistic outlook for industrial re-
use of the Charlestown site, the next minimum-public-invest-
ment alternative is a mixed residential and commercial deveL-
opment. The BRA is hoping that a public investment of
$17.5 million will encourage the additional investment. of
$82 million in private capital.
In proposing residential and commercial uses, the BRA
is working to cash in on the property's three remaining as-
sets: (1) its Location near downtown Boston; (2) its size;
and (3) its location in a historic area containing historic
landmarks and providing views of historic landmarks. Other
large parcels exist near downtown Boston108 which provide more
aesthetic surroundings and a more pleasant journey to down-
town. Yet it appears that the historical amenities of the
Charlestown site may outweigh the negative influences of the
Tobin Bridge and the objectionable journey to downtown, as
evidenced by the interest expressed in the site by the inter-
national real estate firm. The BRA may have finally found
the highest and best use for which there is a current market.
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IV. THE WINNER IS...
ON WHICH USE WILL THE APPRAISAL BE BASED?
How will the fair market value for a 175-year old Naval
Shipyard be determined? As discussed, there is no regional
demand for a shipyard nor is there industrial demand for the
Charlestown Shipyard. Market demand for residential and com-
mercial real estate at that location might exist. As the pro-
spective re-uses for the site move further away from the use
for which the site was originally developed, the public sec-
tor investment In conversion increases, consequently increas-
ing the municipality's need for prompt private sector cooper-
ation and investment to offset their costs. It also increases,
the need for the fair market value to be based on the intended
re-use.
The BRA, in an effort to ensure that fair market value
is based on their re-use proposaLs, has informed GSA of the
recent changes in zoning on the site and kept them up to
date on redevelopment intentions. Despite these efforts, if
the past is any indication, the negotiated sale price will
fail to reflect market demand for the facilities. In the
past, federal overpricing of urban bases has been the result
of the failure of GSA's appraisal to accurately determine the
fair market value. In its drive to obtain reasonable returns
for the Federal government, the realities of the market are
ignored.
To date, there is no concrete proof that overpricing
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will be the case with Charlestown, but, based on past opera-
tions, the fair market-value determined for Charlestown will
reflect what is Federally determined to be the highest and
best use for the property and private sector cooperation
with their determination will be assumed.
Be that as it may, this chapter illustrates that the
market operates according to its own plans, not according to
how the public would like it to operate. If the current
conversion system is to be successful from the municipal view-
point as well as the Federal, it must be modified. Chapter
VI.dicusses alternative courses of action.
CHAPTER VI
ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING SITUATION
All of the alternatives set forth in this chapter are
based on the assumption that municipal acquisition is desir-
able in certain cases of conversion, specifically Charles-
town. This assumption is based on a number of considerations.
In the case of the Boston Naval Shipyard, both the
Charlestown property and the South Boston Annex, the City
needs to acquire the property to insure that development be
coordinated and integrated into Boston's overall planning and
development program and to insure optimal re-use of the pro-
perty. As two of the largest land tracts to become avail-
able in Boston in many years, optimal re-use will be one which
redevelops the properties comprehensively, working toward an
integration of uses as opposed to breaking the property into
small parcels. The size and complexity of the properties
demand that the developer possess a high degree of organiza-
tional capability. Among those expressing an interest in
the properties, Boston is the only one possessing the organ-
izational capaity necessary to secure full re-use of the for-
mer shipyard. Private sector interests in the property have
been for warehousing, dead storage.or single building re-use.
Because of Boston's unique, position as developer of the
shipyard it should have the opportynity for a successful con-
version, that is, Boston should not be left to assume the en-
tire burden of risk in the event of a lack of market demand.
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To achieve this requires one of two things: (I) private
sector support or (ii) modification of the present governmen-
tal disposal-conversion system. Given the New England econ-
omy, the former can not be assumed. Therefore, actions to-
ward realizing the latter must be initiated.
A number of alternatives exist for improving the muni-
cipality's position in the system, ranging from municipal
action to Federal legislation, from streamlining the process
to increasing the fragmentation. Some of the changes are to
be incorporated within the near future while others will
never become a reality Some can be worked in to the exist-
ing framework while others require a complete overhaul of the
system. All are discussed below.
ELiminate miLitary deactivations by showing that the Feder-
al budget is not affected. The total cost of a base closing
remains unknown. Where the Department of Defense can cite
its operational savings from a realignment, the ensuing
costs to other agencies such as Economic Development, In-
terior, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare can not be
determined. The congressional delegation challenged DoD ac-
tions from this angle in the recent Fort Devens realignment.
Senator Kennedy stressed that DoD decides on closings only
from its own perspective and does not take into account any
resulting Federal costs such as welfare and unemployment com-
pensation.10 In a letter to the Director of Management
and Budget, Bay State officials wrote, "We question whether
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there is any mechanism within the government to measure the
total economic impact of a particular action. 110 In a super-
ficial attempt to compare other agency costs to DoD savings,
the officials cited costs to other agencies of more than
$25 million resuLting from the 1974 closing of the Boston
Naval Shipyard. While the Navy projected a savings from the
realignment of fifty-four bases to be $3.5 billion over a ten-
year period, new expenditures were prompted for Federal and
State Labor Departments, and the US Departments of HUD and
EDA.
The possibility of eliminating deactivations is remote.
Because of the time period over which conversion occurs and
the number of areas impacted, the total economic impact of
a deactivation will never be known. Furthermore, public sen-
timent toward the Defense budget would never permit the in-
creases in Defense appropriations which would be necessary
to pursue this course of action. For these reasons, the fol-
Lowing alternative is more likely to occur.
Balance DoD's savings with counter-spending jy other a-
gencies. As noted above, when DoD stops contributing to the
flow of federal funds into an area, other federal agencies are
called upon to compensate for the loss. .Over the years, the
amount of compensation has been increasing. First, OEA, then
EAC, was created to deal exclusively with the economic ad-
justment to military realignments. In addition to this, OEA
will soon have a small kitty for providing monetary assistance.
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A true phasing out of military operations is being increasing-
ly achieved as funds are appropriated to cover all aspects
of adjustment. Funds for re-training, planning, moderniza-
tion and business loans already exist; funds for maintenance
will probably be next.
A balance is already being approached. The federal agen-
cies are continually being called upon to respond to demands
for adjustment assistance. In contrast to the prior alterna-
tive, public sentiment toward increased social welfare appro-
priations lends support to this course of action. 1 1
Strive to compensate for deactivation .by award ing in-
creased defense contracts in the impacted area. Such actions
would serve to complement the preceding alternative, not re-
place it. This should only be viewed as a means of assiting
with the phase-out, not of replacing the base. Defense con-
tracts are subject tothe same fluctuations in national policy
as military installations.
Noted in an earlier study of community adjustment to
realignment, "the industries which utilized these facili-
ties...(were) highly dependent upon Defense activity."1 1 2
Further support of this alternatvie was provided in a recent
editorial on the Fort Devens realignment. "There is an e-
qual obligation (for DoD) to accept responsibility for the
'negative aspects of military policy or the efficiencies they
nominally represent will only be achieved at the cost of hu-
man suffering."" 3 As an immediate course of action this is
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unlikely, given the outlook for the US Defense industry dur-
ing the next decade.
Bring GSA's process of negotiated sales into line with
the real estate market so that their appraisals reflect fu-
ture rather than past uses. Under the present system, the
information on which the appraised value is based is only a-
vailable to GSA officials and those House and Senate commit-
tees which review it for reasonableness. If a public appli-
cant desires information with which to evaluate the reasonable
ness of GSA's asking price, it must duplicate the federal ef-
fort and have a counter-appraisal prepared.
The present system is most successful when private in-
terests locate on the property immediately after municipal
acquisition. If, as in the cases of New York and Watertown,
redevelopment and occupation occur at the private sector's
leisure over an extended time span, the municipality is bur-
dened with not only the amortized acquisition cost but the
costs of protection and maintenance as well. The cost of
holding the property until the highest and best use as deter-
mined by GSA exists to locate on the property' is not reflected.
Appraisal of fair market value is based on rehabilita-
ting the existing structures. This is appropriate for facil-
ities such as Air Force Bases which are relatively new and
have been maintained, unlike the South Boston Annex. The
cost of modernizing outdated, poorly maintained buildings
should enter into the GSA appraisal system. Modernization
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through demolition should. also be considered as a method of
"rehabilitating" the entire site.
Finally, the appraisal system is not sophisticated enough
to deal with the fact that, in the real estate market,.the
demand for land is cyclical. Many privately owned parcels,
such as the B.F. Goodrich tract in Watertown, are awaiting
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an appropriate match between the parcel and a use. In go-
vernment studies of conversion, this period of market inacti-
vity is interpretted as municipal ineptness. Actually, the
municipality is offered one opportunity to acquire the pro-
perty intact. If that opportunity does not coincide with a
period of market activity, the municipality does not have the
option of waiting until it does.
Improving the negotiated sales system would mean making
background information for appraisals available to public a-
gencies and reflecting true demand for the land, the holding
costs of waiting for private sector cooperation and the costs
of modernization.
These changes are not Likely to occur. Those congress-
men who originally advocated "reasonable returns" for federal
investments are stil~ in power. Also, GSA sees its ability
to monitor future uses threatened by proposed liberalizations
of the present system. What is more likely to occur is the
following.
Increase the options for reducing acquisition costs and
iowering lha municipality's holdina costs. Representative
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O'Neill's proposed legislation is an example of how both of
these objectives can be achieved. The public benefit dis-
count for purposes of economic development would provide an-
other option for reducing the cost of acquisition. The bill,
as it presently exists authorizes the Secretary of Commerce,
who has heretofore had no role in the land transfer process,
to review and recommend conveyances under this discount. By
bringing another agency into the review process, it becomes
further fragmented. Such fragmentation allows the munici-
pality to federally land bank the property indefinitely as
more decisions involve more aid more reviews and approvals.
The probability of this alternative occurring has been
demonstrated as very high. O'Neill's bill and others like it
are being introduced in Congress continuously. Increased
fragmentation is the modus opgrandi of the Federal government.
Abolish negotiated sales and transfer land to _A public
body for any public purpose to avoid influencing local public
policy. The existing public benefit discount programs en-
courage defining public needs to match the discounts avail-
able. The desirability of a particular public use in a parti-
cular location is overlooked. The trade-off between lowered
acquisition costs and increased tax yield's to cover acquisi-
tion and maintenance lack objectivity.
Where GSA may view O'Neill's bill as potentially cramping
their style, this alternative would challenge their existence.
Thus, rather than eliminating the federal monitoring of fu-
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ture use, as.would be achieved by the implementation of this
alternative, the opportunities for influencing local public
policy will probably be increased by such actions as O'Neill's
bill.
The preceding suggestions for improving the disposal-
conversion system all require actions at the Federal level.
In addition to these, there are actions which municipalities
can undertake to improve their position in the system.
Recognize that military property is subject to changes
in use just as private property is. On most occasions, the
Charlestown Navy Yard was labe.led "US Military Reservation"
by the City. Thus, leaving it out of City planning efforts
was justified. The Yard could have been administratively
included in the Urban Renewal Plan for Charlestown, making
it eligible today for the City's urban renewal lag money.
Pre-planning would enable increased objectivity on the part
of the municipality in evaluating the various methods of
acquisition and would "fortify" it against the federal de-
sire- to monitor re-use of the site.
The exception to the City's chronic ommisdion of the Navy
Yard and one which illustrates the benefits to be realized
from pre-planning, is the National Historical Park. Conceived
at a time when the Yard was not under the threat of closure,
the plans for and creation of the National Historical Park
have lent direction to the City's re-use planning, serving as
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a building block for redevelopment of the Yard. Furthermore,
it has provided an immediate use for twenty-seven of the 130
acres which were surplussed.
Though the time has passed for Boston, other municipali-
ties could readily incorporate these activities into their
present operations.
Follow Boston's example of working within the Present
system. Boston's effort in the conversion of Charlestown re-
present the epitom'e of accomodating the existing system to
help meet a municipality's needs. Having both an experienced
staff and the examples of earlier base conversions, Boston
was able to identify the critical aspects of the process.
Hence, a thorough inventory of the base facilities and their
conditions was conducted prior to serious consideration of ac-
quisition. This improved the City's bargaining position and
increased the alternatives for acquisition by identifying
buildings of historic value. Next, the City prepared finan-
cial feasibility studies to determine the amortized acquisi-
tion costs and the cash flow necessary to protect and maintain
the property. Now Boston is working toward minimizing the
public investment in redevelopment through federal grants,
public benefit discounts and a simultaneous transfer of the
acquired property to a private developer.
Ag the GSA does in its disposal process, work to make the
property look attractive to prospective tenants. Although
private sector participation ultimately depends on their
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seeing an opportunity in terms of their market, municipalities
can increase the appeal of the site in a couple of ways.
(1) refine development specifications and controls if devel-
opment is to be piecemeal so that an interested developer can
readily determine the compatibility of neighboring uses and
the amount of local support which a proposal might receive;
(2) resolve external issues which affect the development of
the property such as access; and (3)work for inter-departmen-
tal and inter-agency cooperation to demonstrate to a prospec-
tive developer that bureaucratic delays will be minimal. The
latter' is such an important action that any municipality in-
volved in base conversion should already be fully aware of
its role and striving to achieve the cooperation necessary to
implement their conversion strategy.' When the market says
"Go!" it is best to be ready to go.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Since 1949 federal excess property which is determined
to be surplus has been disposed of according to the Federal
Surplus Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949.
One of the largest generators of surplus property is the De-
fense Department whose operational realignments sometimes re-
sult in the deactivation of a military base of hundreds of
acres. Over the years, experience in deactivating, surplus-
sing, disposing and converting to civilian re-use has been ac-
quired at the federal state and community levels.
Some communities have accomplished smooth, rapid, low-
cost conversions by possessing the organizational capacity
and technical skills necessary to respond swiftly to private
sector demands. Other communities have been less successful,
over-committing themselves financially and requiring so much
time to make their decisions that the private sector presum-
ably lost interest in dealing with them. In contrasting suc-
cessful and unsuccessful community conversion efforts, ear-
lier studies concluded that the key to conversion was dedi-
cation and determination at the grass roots level. Such a
conclusion can not be made without qualifications. As this
study shows, there are times when the realities of the real
estate market can outweigh the importance of grass roots de-
dication and determination.
There are examples of communities which, due to their
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lack of expertise in approaching conversion, were unsuccess-
fuL in attaining their original goaLs. New York and Water-
town are two such communities. In their desire to gain con-
trol of the property, they rushed into acquisition without
giving serious consideration to alternative methods of de-
velopment and alternative mechanisms for acquisition and with-
out becoming thoroughly informed about what it -actually was
that they were so anxious to acquire. Blinded by the ex-
panding national economy and visions of a financial bonan-
za, these two communities purchased former military bases
which, through a combination of their lack of organizational
capabilities and the economic climate, they have been un-
able to effectively manage.
In reviewing New York and Watertown to determine the im-
portance of inter-agency cooperation and agency expertise,
four problems in the agencies' handling of the situation are
readily apparent. The means of correcting them are: (1) Be-
come familiar with the property and its facilities, including
age condition and re-use potential, prior to serious consider-
ation of property acquisition; (2) Arrange for adequate pro-
tection and maintenance of the property; (3) Examine alterna-
tive methods of gaining control of the property; and (4) De-
termine how public benefits will be maxmized while public in-
vestment is minimized.
When the Boston Naval Shipyard was deactivated and de-
clared surplus, the City of Boston was concerned that, if
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it became involved in conversion, the earlier mistakes of
other public agencies be avoided to provide the City with the
greatest possibility of carrying out a successful conversion.
Thus, when Boston became involved, it had the organizational
capacity necessary to make and implement re-use decisions.
What is revealed in an examination of the Charlestown
situation is that the conversion process is not capable of
functioning without private sector cooperation. During the
1960's, a period which witnessed the largest number of realign-
ments and conversions ever, the expanding national economy
masked the deficiency. It was in the best interest of the
private sector to voluntarily cooperate in conversion. As
the national economy sLumped, the realities of the private
sector's role could not be overlooked. Where inter-agency
dedication and determination was the key to conversion in the
expanding economy, the current realities of the real estate
market outweigh the importance of agency cooperation in con-
version.
In an effort to defend the self-sufficiency of the exist-
ing disposal-conversion process, public officials blamed each
other for causing its breakdown. In some instances, this
was wholly or partially true. For example, Watertown. But
there are other cases, such as Boston, which exhibit organ-
izational and technical skill, where none of the public agen-
cies is to blame.
There are periods of time in the cyclical real estate
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market when no match exists between a particular parcel of Land
and a particular use. Given time, the match will occur.
But, the existing disposal-conversion process does not al-
Low for that time. It is based on the assumption that the
Federal government, in the form of GSA, can determine the
highest and best re-use of a base, such as a 175-year old Na-
val Shipyard, and when the point of marketing is reached the
market will cooperate. This is in sharp contrast to the ac-
tual situation in which the market operates according to its
own plans, not according to how public agencies would like for
it to operate.
Certain modifications have been made in tie process in at-
tempts to compensate for its incompleteness. Public benefit
discounts were established for prescribed public uses, en-
abling public demand to be substituted for private demand.
These are only relevant in those conversions for which an
eligible public use is appropriate for the property under con-
sideration. The Department of Defense is willing to leave
personal property intact to the extent necessary for a pro-
posed re-use to ease redevelopment. Interim leases can be
arranged, separating bureaucratic delays from immediate re-
use. Federal grants are available to subsidize site prepa-
ration and modernization. Finally, Land banks, formal and
informal, are available to provide the process with the much
needed time required for conversion from a federal to a ci-
vilian use.
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In examining the alternatives which exist for future im-
provements of the process, preservation of the status quo ap-
pears to be the inevitable course of action. Increased ap-
propriations for adjustment and conversions increased federal
fragmentation and expanded definitions of public benefit uses
while the federal role of monitoring future use of the pro-
perty will be retained. A complete restructuring of the
process patterned after the private real estate operations is
desirable, but unlilkely. Such a restructuring would allow the
conversion process to occur naturally over time, but this time
will have to be found in the increased fragmentation of the
system. A restructuring would reduce the fair market value
by projected costs of holding the property over time and costs
of modernization. But, these funds will have to come in the
form of federal grants. A restructuring would allow appro-
priate uses to occur on appropriate locations. But, needs
will continue to be defined around the discounts available.
The desirable restructuring of the disposal-conversion
process will not occur and as the economy gradually regains
its robustness, the deficiencies of the process and hence the
need for the restructuring will again be masked and that sense
of complacency on the part of formulators of public policy
which is only possible in the situation of rapidly rising e-
conomic activity and full employment will again take hold.
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